




Economic Crises: Evidence and
Insights from East Asia
THE EAST ASIAN crisis is only the latest in a series of spectacular eco-
nomic catastrophes in developing countries. In the past twenty years at
least ten countries have suffered from the simultaneous onset of cur-
rency crises and banking crises. This has led to full-blown economic
crises, in many cases with GDP contractions of 5 to 12 percent in the
first year and negative or only slightly positive growth for several years
after. Many other countries have experienced contractions of similar
magnitude following currency or banking crises.
Financial crises are not strictly exogenous; in many cases the slowdown
itself, or the very factors that led to it, have helped to cause a financial
crisis. But there is no doubt that the standard features of financial crises,
including overshooting exchange rates, withdrawal of foreign capital, fail-
ure to roll over short-term debts, internal credit crunches, and the process
of disintermediation have also been important.
Crises are also becoming increasingly frequent, at least relative to
the post-World War II period. There has been, in Gerard Caprio's
memorable phrase, a "boom in bust[s]."' Caprio and Daniela Klinge-
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biel identify banking crises—defined as episodes when the entire bank-
ing system has zero or negative net worth—in sixty-nine countries since
the late 1970s. The U.S. savings and loan (S&L) debacle would prob-
ably not be in the top fifty international banking crises since the early
1980s, although the cost of resolving it was 3.2 percent of GDP, several
times more, in real terms, than that of resolving the U.S. banking crisis
in the 1930s.- With a less stringent definition, Cari-Johan Lindgren,
Gillian Garcia, and Matthew Saal estimate that three-quarters of the
member countries of the Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF) experi-
enced "significant bank sector problems" at some time between 1980
and 1995.- Currency crises have been similariy pervasive. Jeffrey Frankel
and Andrew Rose define a currency crisis as a year in which the cur-
rency depreciates by more than 25 percent, where this depreciation is
at least 10 percentage points higher than depreciation in the previous
year. By this definition, at least eighty-seven countries have suffered
currency crises since 1975, and currency crises have also become more
common recently.•*
Yet in many ways the East Asian crisis is remarkable. It occurred in
the fastest growing region in the world. Many people draw parallels
with the "Mexican miracle" that ended in the 1994-95 "Tequila cri-
sis," but there is no comparison in terms of depth or duration of growth.
Mexico's success in the 1990s is spectacular only in comparison to its
dismal performance in the 1980s. Sebastian Edwards discusses "the
invention" of the Mexican miracle, pointing out that "between 1988
and 1994, and in spite of the reforms, the performance of the economy
was rather modest. Real growth averaged 2.8 percent—significantly
lower than Chile (7.1 percent) and Colombia (4.1 percent), for example;
productivity growth was almost flat until 1993: export expansion was
not overly impressive; real wages barely reached their 1980 level; the
real exchange rate appreciated significantly; private savings experi-
2. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) only cover countries with sufficient data; the S&L
debacle in ihc United States does not make the top twenty-five crises in this list. They
estimate, however, thai including all of the transition economies of eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union would add at least twenty more crisis countries.
3. Lindgren. Garcia, and Saal (19%. p. 20). They identify "banking crises" in
thirty-six countries, or one-fifth of IMF member countries.
4. Frankel and Rose (1996). Using an altemative definition, the International Mon-
etary Fund (1998. p. 77) tinds that currency crises were less common in the deeade
1987-97 than in the previous decade, 1975-86.
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enced a major decline; and poverty and income distribution continued
to be a serious problem.'*' It is hard to imagine the same being said
about Thailand in the years prior to 1997.
Moreover, the largest international rescue packages in history, to-
taling more than $100 billion, failed to stem the problem. The depth of
the collapse in Indonesia is among the largest peacetime contractions
since at least 1960 (excluding the experience of the transition economies
of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union). The East Asian econ-
omies continued to deteriorate, even after the initial policy packages
were revised. Figure I shows that since the initial devaluations, each
month has brought downward revisions of the consensus forecasts for
growth. In the wake of the Tequila crisis, by contrast, capital flows and
economic performance resumed within six months in most countries.
There have already been several comprehensive analyses of the se-
5. Edwards (1998. p. 3).
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quence of events leading up to the Asian crisis.^ In this paper we do
not provide another overview, but address several interrelated questions
that emerge from the crisis. We hope that by advancing the understand-
ing of the East Asian experience, we will enhance the ability to prevent
and respond lo future economic crises.
The magnitude of the East Asian experience requires a fresh look at
some old debates, such as the causes of currency and financial crises,
the appropriate macroeconomic response, and the costs and benefits of
global financial integration. It also makes clear the importance of here-
tofore unexplored problems, such as the circumstances under which
high interest rates are effective in defending a currency and the role of
transparency (or lack thereof) in the on.set and propagation of financial
crises.
We begin with some preliminary methodological remarks on what it
means to "cause" a crisis. In the second section we discuss the most
salient issue in this regard: how did the East Asian miracle unravel into
a deep crisis? We argue that an important change was the pursuit of
rapid financial liberalization and capital account opening without the
deveiopment of sound supervision and regulation. In the third section
we discuss the difficulties faced by East Asian policymakers in coping
with the inflows of capital that resulted from rapid capital market lib-
eralization, given their commitment to financial market liberalization.
In particular, we argue that their ability to undertake preventative
macroeconomic policy was severely constrained. But part of the reason
why they did not pursue preventative policies is that almost no one
expected a crisis. Indeed, it was widely believed that the fundamentals
in these countries were, by and large, sound. In the fourth section we
suggest that these beliefs were reasonable, when viewed through the
lens of the leading financial crisis prediction models. The chief conclu-
sions of this section are thai the East Asian crisis differs in significant
ways from previous crises; that its most important determinants are not
found in the macroeconomic aggregates; and that there is little basis for
the argument that it was in some sense inevitable, at least, not in all of
the countries nor with such severity.
The failure of the old theories to fit the new data has led to the
6. Those worth niiting include Alba and others (1998); Corsetli. Pesenti. and Roubini
(1998b); International Monetary Fund (1997); Radelet and Sachs (1998a. 1998b); World
Bank (1998bt.
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introduction of new explanatory variables. One of these is the ratio of
short-term debt to reserves, the subject of the fifth section. We argue
that the evidence is consistent with the belief that large short-term debt
exposure made the East Asian countries vulnerable to a sudden with-
drawal of confidence. The other new variable is lack of transparency,
the subject of the sixth section. We find that neither theory nor evidence
provides much support for the hypothesis that lack of transparency, or
corruption, played a large part in causing the crisis, although it may
have exacerbated the crisis once it had occurred.
Finally, we look at one of the key issues in responding to currency
crises: the use of temporarily high interest rates to change the exchange
rate permanently. We try to identify the conditions under which such a
policy will be effective, and we assess the evidence from East Asia and
other recent experience. Our analysis not only provides an explanation
for why these policies failed to stem the fall in the exchange rates but
strongly suggests that they were an important factor weakening the
economies, with adverse effects that persisted long after interest rates
had been lowered again. We also look at the interaction between tem-
porarily high interest rates, longer term reforms such as deficit reduc-
tion, and the exchange rate.
Some Methodological Preliminiaries
Many discussions of the causes of the East Asian crisis really address
the proximate causes, beginning with factors such as the current account
deficits or exchange rate misalignments in early 1997. These are them-
selves the endogenous outcomes of deeper, or at least earlier, factors.
We would like to explain how these variables got where they did. Part
of the confusion over what caused the crisis is that there is not a clear
sense of what is meant by causality. Taken in the conventional sense—
a factor that inevitably leads to a given consequence—none of the
alleged causes of the East Asian crisis satisfy. Lack of transparency is
cited, for example, yet some countries far less transparent than those
in East Asia did not have crises, and some of the most transparent
countries have had crises in recent years. A broader interpretation looks
at the issue from a stochastic perspective: causes are factors that in-
crease the probability of a crisis. In this context, the terms "causes"
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and "vulnerability" are often used synonymously. Indeed, the econ-
omy can be viewed as constantly bombarded by shocks. An increase in
vulnerability means an increase in the probability that these shocks,
rather than being absorbed by the economy, will be translated into a
systemic downturn: a currency or financial crisis. In either interpreta-
tion, there can be multiple causes and interaction effects. That is. a
crisis could be caused, in the stochastic or the nonstochastic sense,
either by factor A or factor B, or by the interaction of factors A and B.
Still, while a variety of factors may contribute to a crisis, it is
important to identify the central factors; in a statistical sense, these are
the factors that would have the highest weight in a statistical model
explaining the probability or severity of a crisis. And in interpreting
the causes of a crisis, one should use Occam's razor: rather than listing
every factor that might have contributed to the crisis, one should iden-
tify those factors that, by themselves, are large enough to have caused
(in a stochastic model, to have led to a high probability of) the crisis.
Thus real estate booms, such as that in Thailand, can explain the crisis
in a country without further reference to "crony capitalism." weak
financial institutions, lack of transparency, and so forth. Around the
world, real estate booms are inevitably followed by busts, although one
may not be able to predict when the bust will occur—or even whether
one is in a bubble, until it bursts. To be sure, real estate bubbles are
more likely when financial institutions are weak or base lending on
collateral which, in turn, is valued through market prices.
In models that focus on vulnerability, it may not always be possible
to explain the shocks. But in some cases, the likelihood of shocks—
such as an attack on the currency—may depend on perceived vulner-
ability. Among the shocks faced by the countries of East Asia (and
elsewhere) was a sudden change in the supply function of short-term
capital, based on a sudden change in the markets' perceptions of risk.
Although such changes can sometimes be related to events within a
country or to its policies, often the shocks are almost entirely external.
These include not just irrational contagion, for which there is some
evidence, but also direct linkages through trade or finance, and common
factors facing all developing countries (sometimes called monsoonal
effects), such as increases in the interest rates of industrial countries.^
Such exogenous shocks can be large and very hard to predict.
7. Studies have had difficulty distinguishing between these effects. Calvo and Rein-
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Expectations: Social Psychology and Economic Science
In the stories we tell below (and in most accounts), expectations play
a key role in generating a crisis. Explaining expectations is not an easy
matter. Within the economics profession there are two distinct tradi-
tions: one emphasizing rational expectations, the other, the irrationality
of expectations. Keynes's description of the stock market as a beauty
contest falls more in the latter category, though it is also consistent
with multiple equilibria with rational expectations.
Typically, if there are muitipie rational expectations equilibria, the-
ory provides no guidance as to which equilibrium will emerge—if there
were systematic factors picking out any one equilibrium, there would
not be multiple equilibria. In a sense, then, one cannot explain the
movement from one equilibrium to another, other than to say that there
was a change of expectations, ratified by the market.
While it may never be possible fully to explain the movement from
one equilibrium to another, one can identify exogenous actions—in
particular, by the government or international bodies—that might have
played a role in such a movement, in effect serving as a coordinating
mechanism for the selection of an equilibrium. Accordingly, one inter-
pretation of the East Asian crisis holds that it came to be believed,
partly as a result of pronouncements by respected outsiders, that these
countries had profound problems. Although some of the problems, such
as corruption, had long been recognized, the new emphasis could have
led to the belief that they were significantly worse than had been pre-
viously realized." And even if public pronouncements had no direct
effect on the beliefs of market participants, the characterization of these
problems as the underlying causes of the crisis could have served to
coordinate the market on the low-level equilibrium, as each participant
believed that others might believe, or act as if they believed, the state-
hart (1996) and Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) find evidence for "pure con-
tagion" in previous crises.
8. One should not, however, underestimate the difficulty ut managing expectations.
Those trying Io encourage governnient.s to undertake reforms may need to motivate
them, possibly by emphasizing the severity of the problems. At the same time, they do
not want to scare off markets, should a reform package be adopted. In striking this
balance, il should be recognized that investors may find statements about the magnitude
of a problem more credible than statements ihai policy reforms can redress, ihe problems
in a relevant time horizon.
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ments. Whiie the public diagnosis of the problem might have been
grossly off the mark, the prediction that the downturn would continue
if certain actions were not taken was self-fulfilling, and thus the expec-
tations of market participants were "rational."**
In general, the multiplicity of equilibria may be endogenous; that is.
whether there exists a unique equilibrium depends on the value of some
economic variable. The literature on currency crises has developed
numerous models in which a country with bad fundamentals will defi-
nitely suffer a crisis and a country with good fundamentals will defi-
nitely not do so. For countries in the middle, the expectations of spec-
ulators will be self-fulfilling.'"
Sorting out these alternative hypotheses is not easy. There is consid-
erable evidence casting doubt on the rational expectations hypothesis,
including the fact that forward interest rates and exchange rates are not
unbiased predictors of future spot rates, asset prices are excessively
volatile, and stock prices seem to display mean reversion and other
systematic discrepancies from the efficient markets hypothesis." How-
ever, these are all joint tests of rational expectations and some other
hypothesis; failure may in fact indicate that only the other hypothesis
is rejected. But even if one does not believe that the market is well
described by rational expectations, models using this assumption can
help to assess the consistency of model formulations. The assumption
of rational expectations is also a useful benchmark against which to
evaluate different policies.
If expectations are irrational, one must be circumspect in forecasting
the effect of any particular action on beliefs. To be sure, irrationality
is not inconsistent with predictability. But while regressions based on
past behavior provide insight into the formation of expectations in the
past, they provide littie assurance that such patterns will continue in
the future. Indeed, when there are systematic but irrationai patterns and
these can be analyzed, there typically will be opportunities for arbi-
trage. The irrationalities that persist are, by definition, unpredictable.'-
9. See, for example. Feldstein (1998); Radeiet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b).
10. See. for example. Cole and Kehoe (1996); Obstfeld (19961; Sachs, Tornell. and
Velasco (1996).
11. For an excellent recent survey, see Campbell, Lo. and MacKinlay (1997). es-
pecially chapter 2. See also Poterba and Summers (1988); Shiller (1989); Tyron (1979);
Frankel (1980).
12. One often may not be able to reject the hypothesis of rational expectations, given
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Economists—and journalists—do not have a particularly good rec-
ord at predicting market responses to events and policies, especially in
relation to such intangibles as market confidence. Will market confi-
dence be enhanced if an economy goes into a deeper recession? Will
market confidence be enhanced if economic policies undermine political
and social stability? Will market confidence be enhanced if monetary
authorities take actions that seem suited to a Latin American crisis,
rather than to the specifics of the East Asian economies? What is clear
is that different market participants, and different observers of different
market participants, have different views on these issues of market
psychology. While this paper cannot subject these perceptions to either
the psychiatrist's couch or the political scientist's analysis of rival
interests, it can address the question of what might have seemed rea-
sonable expectations, by using the economist's standard tool kit of
theoretical and econometric analyses.
Miracle versus Crisis
The question of how the widely touted East Asian miracle tumed
into one of the worst financial crises of this century is not merely of
historical interest. It is essential for understanding why some countries
are vulnerable to economic crises and what can be done to reduce their
vulnerability. Central to our historical analysis is the attempt to explain
how East Asia, and the world around it, changed in ways that made the
region more vulnerable to crisis. We argue that one of the most impor-
tant developments was the rapid liberalization of financial markets, both
domestic and international, without the corresponding development of
proper regulation or supervision.
The Miracle Was Real
The shift in sentiment about the East Asian economies has been
remarkable.'^ Until the outbreak of the crisis. East Asian economies
the paucity of data; typical tests are not very powerful In many cases, one should be
content to identify "consistent" expectations.
13. For a more extensive picture of East Asia's previous successes, see Radelet and
Sachs (1998b); World Bank (1998a); Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Sound Finance and Sustainable
Development in Asia," speech to the Asia Development Forum. Manila, March 12.
1998 (available on the worldwide web).
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were widely praised for rapid growth with equity that resulted in large
reductions in poverty and increases in longevity. Between 1966 and
1996, per capita income grew at an average annual rate of 4.7 percent
in Indonesia, 7.4 percent in Korea, 4.4 percent in Malaysia, and 5.2
percent in Thailand. Growth rates were also very stable: over the same
period, reai GDP growth was positive in each year for Indonesia and
Thailand, and fell in only one year for Korea (1980) and Malaysia
(1985). Although most of these countries had experienced financial
crises previously, the consequences had been relatively mild and short-
lived.'•*
This growth, combined with a relatively unchanged income distri-
bution, has resulted in the dramatic drop in poverty rates shown in
figure 2. In the region as a whole, poverty rates dropped from roughly
60 percent in 1975 to roughly 20 percent in 1995; in Indonesia, even
14. See Siigliiz and Uy (1996) for a discussion of East Asian countries' responses
to earlier crises.
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more impressively, from 64 percent in 1975 to 7 percent in 1997."
Figure 3 shows a range of recent World Bank forecasts for the poverty
rate in 2000 in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand,
depending on the change in inequality."" The increase in poverty is
dramatic. If inequality increases as an economy contracts, the number
of people living on less than $1 a day in the four Southeast Asian
countries most affected by economic crisis could rise from 30 million
in 1997 to roughly 60 million in 2000. But even the collapse in Indo-
nesia would not come close to fully undoing that country's economic
accomplishments since 1975.
Contrasting Perspectives on East Asia's Miracle and Crisis
The success of the East Asian economies—in growth, stability, and
poverty reduction—led naturally to the question of its sources. Many
observers looked to these economies to understand how elements of
their development strategies could be used to promote rapid growth in
other parts of the developing world. Among the frequently identified
contributors to the miracle were outward orientation, especially with
regard to exports; high rates of saving; and effective governments.'^
In the wake of the crisis, the East Asian economies have been cas-
tigated for mismanaged exchange rate policies, badly regulated finan-
cial markets, lack of transparency, wasteful investment, current account
deficits, and inadequate corporate governance. Listing these real and
alleged problems has led many analysts to believe, in hindsight, that
the crisis was inevitable—in spite of the fact that the.se countries had
15. This stalislic for Indonesia has been challenged in Marcu.s W. Brauthli. "Speak
No Evil: Why the World Bank Failed lo Anticipate Indonesia's Deep Crisis," Wall
Street Journal. July 30. 1998. p. Al. However, these numbers are derived from an
extremely well-designed household survey that measures income, the value of con-
sumption, the quantity of consumption, and local prices. Falsifying such survey results,
as charged in the article, would be very difficult. As with all poverty statistics, there is
.some debate about technical issues, including the appropriate prices to use. which affect
[he measurement by a few percentage points. Also. In Indonesia, as in many developing
countries, a large number of people have incomes jus( over the standard intemational
poverty measure of $1 a day. But these qualifications do not affect our assessment of
the magnitude of Indonesia's accomplishment.
16. World Bank (1998a). These numbers are based on a reasonable estimate of the
contraction in GDP and the historical relationship between GDP, income distribution,
and poverty.
17. See. for example. World Bank (1993); Page (1994); Stiglitz (1996).
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weathered earlier storms, such as the oil crises of the 1970s, as well or
better than supposedly less vulnerable economies.
Remarkably, many of the issues that were identified as key to East
Asia's success have now been labeled the key causes of its failure. Even
the mere semantic shift from "business-government coordination" to
"crony capitalism" has changed the way people view East Asia. The
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Some of the contrast between positive and negative interpretations
comes from the fact that they refer to different countries within the
region: Taiwan has more vigorous competition than Korea, and Hong
Kong is much more open than Thailand.'" And some of the criticism
follows from ideology: many of those who are generally suspicious of
the rote of government have been quick to blame government intrusion
for the crisis, although they were previously reluctant to give govern-
ment credit for the successes of the preceding three decades.
Any explanation of the East Asian crisis must deal jointly with the
crisis today and the region's remarkable growth and stability in the
past. Given their past record, it does not make sense to characterize the
East Asian economies as inherently vulnerable to crisis, despite their
recent experiences. One must therefore identify change, either in the
East Asian economies themselves or in the world around them.
18. While it is also possible that certain changes have made the positive interpreta-
tion more apposite to the earlier period of growth period and the negative interpretation
more apposite today, our discussion below suggests that, for the most part, no such
changes have in fact occurred.
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Figure 3. Poverty Rate Effects of a 10 Percent Reduction in GDP,
Selected East Asian Countries'
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Reconciling the Crisis with the Miracle
There are three arguments that would potentially reconcile the East
Asian miracle and the region's past stability with its present crisis:
(1) the so-called East Asian system was ill suited to cope with changes
in the world around it, especially the increased integration of interna-
tional capital markets, which increased vulnerability; (2) policies that
worked well at an earlier stage of development were ill suited to a more
advanced situation; and (3) the East Asian economies abandoned the
policies that had served them so well in the past. The most plausible
explanations rely on some combination of these three hypotheses.
In regard to the first hypothesis, larger capital flows and greater
correlation of movements across markets places enormous strains on
economies. Several papers have linked e.xtemal factors, particularly
industrial country interest rates, to the rate of capital flows to devel-
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oping countries and the probability of banking and currency crises.'**
The huge change in investor sentiment—both in the perception of risk
and the willingness to bear it—reflected in interest rate spreads, not
only for emerging market securities but also for "high yield" (that is,
risky) corporate securities in developed countries, had profound effects
on several developing countries in late summer and fall of 1997. Al-
though it is difficult to assess the change in this phenomenon over time,
it is likely that as investors from industriai countries increasingly di-
versify iheir investments, these swings in sentiment would become
larger and have a greater impact on developing economies—regardless
of the degree of capital account liberalization in the developing coun-
tries, so long as they are open at all. Butclearly the more open a country
is, especially to highly volatile short-term capital flows, the greater is
the impact of such swings.-"'
The second, and related, hypothesis also has some credibility. In
particular, policies that provide effective insurance against certain risks
may work when an economy is small and there are relatively few firms
in the manufacturing sector, but become impractical when the economy
grows larger and more complex. For instance, Korea deliberately pur-
sued a policy of maintaining high debt-to-equity ratios to leverage
greater investment. Some analysts see this high leveraging as an im-
portant component of East Asia's success.^' But it also left Korean
corporations vulnerable to a growth slowdown. In the past, the govern-
ment had played a complementary role by absorbing shocks through
directed credit and other mechanisms, thereby mitigating much of the
risk associated with high debt-to-equity ratios. As a result. Korea ex-
perienced very consistent growth and was not seriously affected by the
global economic shocks of the past twenty-five years. As Korea has
moved toward a market economy, with a more limited role for govern-
19. See, for example, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993); Frankel and Rose
(1996); Eichengreen and Rose (1998); Milesi-Fcrretli and Razin (1998).
20. Wilh highly diversified portfolios, investors become more risk neutral; with
different securities close to perfect substitutes for each olher, slight changes in beliefs
concerning expected returns (or slight changes in Ihe opportunity cost of funds) can have
huge effects on portfolio allocation. Moreover, improved transparency may produce
greater similarity in beliefs, leading to greater price adjustments in response to certain
exogenous events. We discuss the.se issues more fully below.
21. See. tor example. Wade (1990). This policy can be justilied on the basis of a
scarcity of entrepreneurs and a limited supply of equity capital. Critics would argue ihat
govemment poljeies may have contributed to the latter.
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ment, the govemment has shown greater reluctance to engage in mas-
sive bailouts. Indeed, the increased openness of the economy—and the
foreign debt accumulated by Korean companies after liberalization—
have made such a bailout difficult at best."
Evidence of the third hypothesis is seen most clearly in the case of
financial market liberalization. Before the crisis, several papers and
books documented, usually with approbation, the significant steps taken
by the East Asian economies toward liberalization of their financial
systems.^' Historically, these countries' financial systems were all
highly regulated, with caps on interest rates, directed credit to allocate
the scarce supply of credit, limitations on asset hoiding by financial
institutions, limitations on foreign entry into the banking systems, and
restrictions on foreign direct investment and foreign borrowing. Over
the past decades, many of the.se restrictions have been eased. Rapid
financial liberalization without a commensurate strengthening of regu-
lation and supervision contributed significantly to the crisis. We illus-
trate with brief discussions of Korea and Thailand; developments in
Indonesia and Malaysia were similar.
In Korea, some of the problems with the previous system became
apparent in the overcapacity in the chemical industries and its role in
the economic crisis of 1980. In response, the government adopted a
series of progressive policies to loosen the regulations on bank lending,
sold its shares in banks, increased restrictions on links between banks
and chaebol (industrial conglomerates), and decontrolled interest rates.
The result, shown in figure 4, was that the share of policy-based loans
decreased steadily from 49.3 percent in 1973 to 24.9 percent in 1991.
At the same time, Korea progressively freed its exchange market, first
for current account transactions and later for capital account transac-
tions, including relaxing and lifting restrictions on foreign direct in-
vestment and borrowing abroad.
Thailand has also witnessed rapid financial liberalization over the
past decade. Restrictions on interest rates for many types of borrowing
and lending were eliminated in the early 1990s. At the same time, banks
22. Wade and Veneroso (1998) have stressed ihe complementarity of high debt-to-
equily ratios and other supporting policies: they place much of the blame tor the crisis
on Ihe removal of ihe latter, rather lhan on the former.
23. See Fry (1995), Patrick and Park (1994), and Ito and Krueger (1996), among
oihers. Much of the discussion that follows benefits from these sources.
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were given greater scope in decisionmaking for loans, through the
relaxation of mandates in favor of certain types of lending {for example,
to agricuiture) and the elimination of restrictions against other types of
lending (for example, to real estate). In 1991 reserve requirements were
reduced, and the scope of permissible capital market activities by banks
was expanded to include activities such as financing equity purchases
on margin. In addition, by relaxing regulations and increasing incen-
tives, the government promoted a series of financial innovations, in-
cluding greater use of securities markets and increased access to off-
shore borrowing and derivatives. Furthermore, the number of nonbank
financial institutions expanded dramatically.
The Risks of Rapid Financial Liberalization
The experiences of dozens of developed and developing countries
over the past decade clearly illustrate the risks posed by rapid financial
liberalization unaccompanied by significant strengthening of supervi-
sion and regulation. This observation is confirmed by several systematic
empirical studies and explained by well-developed theory.
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The case of the developing countries is most striking. Twenty years
ago, most developing countries had highly repressed financial systems,
in which banks faced little competition for funds and relatively few
choices in the disposal of those funds. Liberalization found many banks
in a relatively weak position, unable to compete against innovative
newcomers. Moreover, the erosion of the franchise value of banks (the
present-discounted value of future profits) has created an incentive to
take more risk.^* Where these incentives were not offset by better su-
pervision and regulation, serious problems have emerged or are likely
to emerge. Experience shows, however, that it is much easier to get rid
of restrictions than it is to create prudential oversight and regulation.
Indeed, while the process of liberalization puts more demands on reg-
ulators and supervisors, it is often accompanied by the erosion oftheir
capabilities, as the newly liberalized private sector bids the best per-
sonnel away from the public sector.
Furthermore, banks and other financial institutions often have only
a limited ability to cope with the greater choice opened up by liberali-
zation. In a highly protected environment, bank managers lacked in-
centives to invest in credit assessment or risk-monitoring skills. Rapid
liberalization has made these skills necessary, but they cannot be learnt
overnight. The increasing prevalence of derivatives and other complex
financial instruments have further taxed the often limited expertise of
bankers and supervisors.
There is overwhelming evidence that financial liberalization in-
creases the vulnerability of countries to crises. It includes case studies
of several countries, both developing and developed, beginning with
the path-breaking analysis of Chile's 1982 crisis by Carlos Diaz-
Alejandro.''' A recent study of banking crises points out that "in 18 of
the 26 banking crises studied . . . the financial sector had been liber-
alized during the preceding five years, usually less.''^ *" Furthermore.
Asli Demirguq-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache have found systematic
cross-country evidence that financial liberalization, as measured by the
24. See Caprio and Summers (1996); Hellman. Murdock, and Sliglitz (1997).
25. Diaz-Alejandro (1985). For the contribution of financial liberalization to crises
among the Scandinavian countries, see Steigum (1992) and Kiander and Vartia (1996);
for an alternative view, see Drees and Pazarba^ioglu (1995).
26. Kaminsky and Reinhari (1998. pp. lO-I I).
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relaxation of controls on interest rates, increases the probability of a
banking crisis."
The East Asian countries also pursued capital account liberalization,
another source of increased risk. This risk was manifested in the $109
billion reversal of net private capital flows (more than 10 percent of
GDP) to the region between 19% and 1997, with most of the adjustment
in the last half of 1997.-'* Although the volatility was to some degree
endogenous, several other countries with reasonably open capital ac-
counts also experienced great volatility in capital flows and risk pre-
miums during 1997. If virtually all developing countries become vul-
nerable when they open up their capital accounts, the presumption is
that the problem is capital account convertibility (given the constraint
that macroeconomic policy is never perfect), not macroeconomic pol-
icy. This volatility, with its potential long-run cost for economic
growth, is probably part of the reason that cross-country studies have
not found any relationship between capital account convertibility and
economic growth.^^
Coping with Capital Flows
The financial and capital account liberalization ofthe 1980s left the
East Asian countries with fewer tools to cope with the strains imposed
by the surge of capilal inflows in the 1990s, itself partly a result ofthe
liberalization. Large inflows of capital pose challenges for an economy,
especially when exchange rates are fixed. This is all the more so when
the fiows come in the form of unhedged short-term debt, as was the
case for much of East Asia (we discuss this below). Furthermore, par-
ticular characteristics of East Asia, especially the high saving rates,
reduced the benefits of capital inflows and exacerbated the difficulties.
But dozens of other developing countries around the world have also
had to address large increases in capital flows over the past decade.
27. Demirgu^-Kum and Detragiache (I998h).
28. fnstitule of Ititemational Finance (1998, p. 4). According to these estimates. 76
perceni of the reversal was accounted for by commercial banks loans. It is also nole-
worthy (hat foreign diretl investment to Ihe five most affected East Asian economies—
Indonesia. Korea. Malaysia, ihe Philippines, and Thailand—is estimated to have re-
mained essentially unchanged.
29. See. for example. Alesina. Grilli. and Milesi-Ferretti (1994); Rodrik (1998).
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And several of them are currently facing many of the dilemmas faced
by East Asian policymakers in the years leading up to the crisis. They
need answers to two questions; First, what is the best macroeconomic
policy stance to avoid a crisis? And second, what other policies can
broaden the set of macroeconomic policies consistent with avoiding a
crisis? Although the answers clearly depend on particular circum-
stances, some general principles emerge from our analysis of the East
Asian experience.
At the time, it was far from obvious what were the best policies to
cope with the capital flowing into East Asia. Virtually every possible
course was fraught with potential problems. There is no doubt that
macroeconomic mistakes were made. In many cases, current account
deficits were too large, real exchange rates were appreciating, and
investment was being concentrated in the nontradables sector. In ret-
rospect, Thailand's fixed exchange rate was unsustainable and probably
should have been adjusted, but this was not apparent, especially in the
earlier period when an adjustment would have been less costly. Nor is
it clear that floating the baht, or adjusting the exchange rate, would in
fact have averted the crisis.
Also in retrospect, Thailand's current account deficit of 7.9 percent
of GDP in 1996 was unsustainable. At the time, even this was not
obvious. The current account deficit was used to fund an increase in
investment over and above the high and rising domestic saving rate.
The expected returns to this investment, based on past growth, appeared
to be high. Fundamentally, the fact that the current account deficit was
mostly financed by private-to-private capital flows means that the mar-
ket believed that these funds would yield higher expected returns than
what would be required to service them.^° Moreover, because they were
private flows, there was not the issue of capturing the returns, which
sometimes arises in the case of sovereign borrowing with high social
returns.
There is a consistent economic rationale for describing large govern-
ment deficits or large current account deficits fueled by public borrow-
ing—problems faced by many countries in the 1980s—as inefficient
macroeconomic imbalances. There is no general presumption that pol-
30. Except 10 the extent that market participants were counting on a bailout. The
fact that a bailout occurred made such beliefs rational. So far. the internaiional com-
munity has not devised a credible way to foreclose that option.
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icy decisions will maximize social welfare and many reasons to believe
that they will not. The case forthe inefficiency ofa 7.9 percent current
account deficit that is largely due to private borrowing is more difficult.
To the extent that one believes in the rationality and efficiency of
markets, governments in the region should not have been concerned.
The deficits should have been sustainable simply because they were
used to finance investments that should have yielded returns in excess
ofthe intere.st charged. Andthat is the key mistake: governments should
have been aware of the systemic risk that these private actions imposed
on the economy as a whole.
There are several reasons for the discrepancy between private and
social risk in decisions about accumulating, for instance, short-term,
foreign-currency-denominated debt. First, individual borrowers do not
take into account the credit risk they impose on the economy as a whole.
in part, this derives from the peculiar institutional feature ofthe "sov-
ereign ceiling." whereby no firm can receive a higher credit rating than
the country in which it is based. Second, to the degree that short-term
debt increases the probability of a crisis, which is a gigantic market
failure with severe aggregate consequences, it clearly represents an
externality. Third, private debt accumulation may increase the proba-
bility of a bailout; or even if owners are not bailed out, may lead the
government to incur large fiscal costs in resolving the banking prob-
lems. Finally, to the degree that the market expects a bailout, regardless
of whether one takes place, there is a distortion. It would have been
difficult for the East Asian governments to make credible commitments
not to engage in domestic bailouts; to commit the international com-
munity not to conduct a bailout would have been virtually impossible."
These externalities show that Thailand's 7.9 percent current account
deficit should have been worrisome. The standard policy prescription
is to address this sort of problem with macroeconomic tools, monetary
or exchange rate policy and fiscal policy. We argue that in the case of
East Asia, all the standard policies had severe drawbacks. But the
discrepancy between private and social returns that made this current
account deficit a potential problem in the first place also provides a
rationale for using domestic and international financial restraints to
31. Even if investors (or lenders) had been made lo pay the lull costs of the exter-
nality they generated, the problem would have been only partly solved—the ex post
incentive distortions (that is. the moral hazard problem) would remain.
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address the problem. In East Asia, the implementation of such restraints
wa.s circumscribed by strong belief in the need to pursue financiai lib-
eralization. As a result, the set of' *good" macroeconomic policies was
extremely small. Mild financiai restraint could have extended this set
and made it substantially easier to conduct macroeconomic policy.
The Sources of Capital Flows to East Asia
Net private long-term capital flows to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phil-
ippines, and Thailand increased from 3.3 percent of GNP in 1990 to
8.3 percent of GNP in 1996. As can be seen from figure 5, these were
pan of a wave of capital flows to developing countries, which increased
more than six-fold between 1990 and 1997: from 1.0 percent of devel-
oping country GNF to 4.1 percent. Nearly four out of five middle-
income countries saw the net flow of long-term private capital increase
between 1990 and 1996. by a substantial amount in the majority of
cases.
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One ofthe greatest difficulties faced by policymakers during capital
inflow episodes is to assess whether the inflows are temporary or per-
manent. In general, there are three possibilities. First, the high level of
inflows couid represent the beginning of a permanent, or long-lasting,
trend toward higher capital inflows. Second, they could represent a
permanent adjustment in the stock of capital, and thus a temporary
period of high inflows followed by no net flows. Third, they could
represent a completely transitory phenomenon, which is likely to be
reversed by capital outflows. Each of these possibilities has very dif-
ferent implications for macroeconomic policymaking.
In assessing the future course of capital flows, one important consid-
eration is whether the increased capital inflows are caused by internal
policy changes or external developments. Relatively early in the recent
wave of private capital flows to developing countries, Guillermo Calvo,
Leonardo Leiderman. and Carmen Reinhart observed the high correla-
tion of capital flows across countries, noting that fiows resumed strongly
to all major Latin American countries in the early 1990s, despite the
fact that some had initiated reforms much earlier and others had barely
begun. They documented the importance of external factors in explain-
ing between 30 to 60 percent of the variance in their proxy for monthly
capital flows to these Latin American countries.^- In general, foreign
factors can include fundamentals such as U.S. interest rates, balance
of payments developments, or growth; institutional innovations that
lead to greater global integration; changes in sentiment toward different
regions (or emerging tnarkets as a whole) or reductions in the degree
of "irrational"' home bias in investment; and overall changes in the
market risk premium.
In addition, changes in domestic policies can lead to large surges in
capital flows. Capital account liberalization can lead to stock adjustment
ihat implies huge transitory flows, as can policies that are conducive to
international capital or to particular types of money. An example of the
latter i,s the Bangkok International Banking Facility, which was estab-
lished by Thailand in 1993 to attract short-term money.
Most developing countries are small relative to the pool of foreign
capital, and such capital inflows can place very large strains on them.
32. Calvo. Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), See Femdndcz-Arias (1996) for an
overview of the "push versus pull" debate, which concludes that extemal factors played
a key role in the surge of capital flows to developing countries in the 1990s.
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And as the above discussion indicates, without a single good explana-
tion for the flows at the time or even in retrospect, it is difficult to
assess future prospects. The policy implications of believing that capital
flows fall and rise with U.S. interest rates are very different from the
implications that derive from the belief that they are the result of a
secular trend in global integration.
The Fixed Exchange Rate Bind
If a country has a flexible exchange rate, capital inflows will increase
the demand for the local currency and lead to a real appreciation of the
exchange rate. In a country with a fixed exchange rate, the upward
pressure on the nominal exchange rate is averted by the accumulation
of reserves by the central bank. To prevent this process from translating
into an increase in the domestic money supply, and thus higher inflation
and a real appreciation of the currency, policymakers sterilize the
money growth by a variety of means. In the process, domestic interest
rates rise." In Thailand in 1996, for example, short-term money market
rates rose 400 basis points above comparable U.S. interest rates. This.
together with the belief that the exchange rate peg would last—justified
by the fact that for thirteen years the exchange rate had largely drifted
in a narrow band between 25 and 27 baht to the dollar—led to a shift
in the composition of capital flows toward unhedged short-term debt.
Interest rate spreads were similar in other East Asian countries, after
adjusting for expected or actual depreciation in 1996, with similar con-
sequences for capital flows.^•'
In addition to leading to changes in the composition of capital in-
flows, the surge in capital flows boosted domestic demand and, because
the supply of nontradables is more inelastic than the supply of tradables,
raised the relative price of nontradables, encouraging the allocation of
investment to the nontradable sector. This led to booming asset prices
and perhaps contributed to the real estate bubble—although the real
33, Fora simple model ofthis process, see Calvo (1991).
34, If one believes in i me rest rate arbitrage, the difference in interest rates is illusory:
the lower foreign interest rales are paid for by expected depreciation in the currency.
But most market participants do not believe that the market works perfectly, so they
think (and act as if) they can save money by borrowing abroad. This is not arbitrage,
however, as borrowers found out so painfully in East Asia in 1997, and again in Russia
in August 1998.
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estate bubble may, in turn, have helped pull capital in. The result was
that the ability to repay the short-term foreign-currency-denominated
debt was largely tied to the long-term performance of the nontraded
sector: a situation of serious currency and maturity mismatch. Thus
although the buildup of vulnerability was the result of private decisions,
by both foreign lenders and domestic borrowers, the macroeconomic
policies pursued by the East Asian governments may have helped to
create incentives for these decisions.'^
Could the East Asian Governments Have Altered Their Exchange
Rate Policies?
What could the East Asian governments have done differently to
avoid these strains? One possible approach would have been through
exchange rate policy, either adjusting the pegged (or quasi-pegged)
exchange rates or abandoning them altogether by moving to a managed
float, or even a pure float. Changing or widening the pegs would likely
have accomplished little. Market forces were pushing for greater ap-
preciation in the nominal exchange rate, which would have led to
greater real appreciation, together with a larger trade deficit and even
larger capital inflows."'
Many observers think that abandoning the pegs altogether would
have reduced the incentives for unhedged borrowing. This conventional
wisdom needs to be qualified. Most of these incentives for hedging are
also present in fixed rate systems, and it is not obvious that they would
have been greatly strengthened by floating the exchange rate. Histori-
cally, fixed exchange rates systems have frequently been attacked, re-
sulting in large discrete changes in the exchange rate. Rational investors
should have taken this possibility into account. Risk-averse borrowers
should have obtained cover. That they did not do so must be viewed as
a market faiiure: borrowers either believed that they knew better than
the market, or were inhibited from obtaining insurance by the associated
transaction costs."
35. This point is emphasized by Alba and others (1998).
36. Unless it raised expectations of a devaluation in the future.
37. Note that to ihe extent that the "market" believes the exchange rate can be
sustained, the price of insurance will be lower. Failure to purchase insurance in an
economy with a well-functioning insurance market cannot be blamed on the formal
exchange rate regime or the history of exchange rate movements.
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Even if abandoning pegs would have reduced unhedged borrowing,
possibly by signaling the intentions ofthe government, the reluctance
ofthe East Asian countries is understandable, given the scant historical
experience of successful transitions away from pegged exchange rates.
In addition, policymakers were adamant about avoiding even a rela-
tively small increase in inflation, although this might mean that the
expansion of domestic demand was channeled into a rising current
account deficit and a higher probability of a major crisis. While an
appreciation of the currency would have had deflationary effects, this
may have been more than offset by the lower interest rates. Another
important objection to letting exchange rates float was that the real
appreciation that would likely have followed would have further dis-
torted the structure of the economy, adversely affecting the export
sector, which had been the engine of growth of these economies for
two decades.
Moreover, to the degree that one believes in irrational swings in
investor moods (manifested as excess volatility in exchange rates), there
is a very plausible story by which, given the circumstances ofthe East
Asian economies, a floating exchange rate would have exacerbated the
problems. Consider the following thought experiment. Foreign inves-
tors" expectations that the real estate bubble will continue remain ro-
bust, even as the govemment allows the exchange rate to float. To be
sure, investors might be a little more reluctant to enter, since there is
no guarantee of the exchange rate (though with rational expectations,
they should have realized there never really was a guarantee). Bui it is
equally plausible, with irrational expectations, that the flow might in-
crease: as investors see the exchange rate increase, they might extrap-
olate the change, so that investing in, say, Thailand looks an even
better deal, with the huge real estate returns plus an appreciating cur-
rency. The increase in the exchange rate discourages exports, and thus
allows internal macroeconomic balance to be achieved at a lower inter-
est rate than otherwise. There is no problem in financing the trade
deficit; indeed, the flow of funds into the country is what "caused" the
trade deficit. But suddenly one day the real estate bubble bursts, just as
every other bubble has burst, whether in an open or a closed economy,
with fixed or flexible exchange rates. In the process, capital flows
reverse, and the exchange rate plummets. This floating-cum-bubble
scenario would lead to greater real appreciation, greater resource real-
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location to the nontradable sector, and smaller reserves, as compared
with the fixed rate scenario, and thus would result in a larger exchange
rate crash and more economic disruption.
This thought experiment makes clear that flexible exchange rate re-
gimes would not necessarily have insulated the East Asian economies
against the ravages brought on by a sudden change in expectations in a
world with no restrictions on capital flows. Our point is not that the
Bast Asian countries conducted their exchange rate policies perfectly,
nor that every exchange rate regime is equally good (or bad). The point
is just that there was no obvious exchange rate policy that strictly
dominated the others, or that would, by itself, have insulated the coun-
tries from the volatility of investor sentiment. Furthermore, only in
Thailand was there any strong reason to believe that the exchange rate
policy was unsustainable at the time. And when this becatne obvious,
in the first half of 1997, the risks of changing the policy were even
larger, because of the extreme sensitivity of markets to signals about
Thailand's health and the commitment of policymakers to maintaining
the exchange rale.
The Limitations of Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Given the constraints on exchange rate policy, the traditional instru-
ments for responding to the capital inflows were monetary policy and
fiscal policy. Under fixed exchange rates and perfect capital mobility,
monetary policy is completely endogenous. In the reality of the East
Asian economies, instead of leading to infinite adjustments of reserves
as in the Mundell-Fleming model, monetary policy leads to finite ad-
justments of reserves and is thus sustainable for a time. But monetary
policymakers faced a quandary. Higher interest rates may have reduced
investment, and thus the need to borrow from abroad, but they may
also have created additional incentives to finance investment through
unhedged short-term foreign borrowing. Moreover, the higher interest
rates (like the real appreciation) distorted the economy, constraining
investment in potentially more economically efficient sectors to make
room for those sectors favored by foreign investors, such as commercial
real estate.
The problems with using monetary policy to cope with capital inflows
are well known and have led to the standard prescription that countries
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should deal with capital inflows through tighter fiscal policy. This strat-
egy increases national saving, lowers the current account deficit, and
reduces Ihe pressures on the economy. The East Asian countries fol-
lowed this prescription as capital fiows rose in the 1990s, eliminating
the often modest deficits that they had run in the 1980s and shifting into
surplus. As a result, the ratio of public debt to GDP fell to 24.1 percent
of GDP in Indonesia, 8.6 percent of GDP in Korea, and 3.6 percent of
GDP in Thailand. Several observers have argued that the East Asian
countries should have pursued even tighter fiscal policy. According to
Pedro Alba and others, "the fiscal impulse (the change in the fiscal
stance) turned positive at a time when these economies were experienc-
ing overheating pressures," contributing to the crisis.'"
Whether or not this analysis is correct, it would be hard to describe
East Asian fiscal policy as a mistake. First, it is important to remember
that fiscal stance is very difficult to fine tune, or even to measure."* In
all countries, spending and (even more so) revenues are very erratic
and depend on factors beyond the control of policymakers. Even the
structural deficit, which nets out the effect of economic fluctuations, is
very influenced by unpredictable factors. Second, and more important,
it is very hard to fault a government running a surplus of 2 percent of
GDP and government debt below 10 percent of GDP, as was Thailand.
There were strong medium- to long-term arguments against running a
larger surplus. Public investment was one of the major bottlenecks to
future East Asian growth. Public infrastructure was not up to the de-
mands ofthe modern economy; and in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thai-
land education, which earlier had led the growth, had fallen behind.
Cutting back public spending would simply have meant agreeing to the
diversion of investment from schools and roads toward shopping malls
and office towers. Alternatively, the government couid have increased
it.s surplus through higher taxes. The result (assuming that Ricardian
38, Alba and others (1998, p, 21),
39. In fact, it Is noi obvious that fiscal stances were positive in the five most affected
East Asian countries: Indonesia. Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, Actual
budget surpluses rose in Indonesia. Korea, and Thailand in 1995 (a year of rising growth
rates) and then fell in ail five countries in 1996 (a year of declining growth rates for all
except the Philippines). Although a careful analysis of the numbers may indeed provide
evidence that the net fiscal stance was positive in these countries, the ambiguities
involved in this calculation emphasize that one should not underestimate the difficulty
of making macroeconomic policy in the context of rapid capital inflows,
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equivalence does not hold) would have been that consumption, which
had been falling as a fraction of GDP, would have been reduced stil)
further. Again, it is not obvious that this would have been desirable,
given the already high—by many accounts, overly high—saving rate.
Financial Regulation and RestraitUs
If one accepts the pegged exchange rates and open capital accounts,
the final policy instrument available was domestic microeconomic pol-
icy. Would better financial regulation, along the lines of the Basle
standards, have prevented East Asia's crisis? Although good financial
regulation is clearly desirable, both for growth and stability, one should
not overestimate its ability to overcome macroeconomic incentives.
Financial regulation might have succeeded in reducing bank exposure,
but the incentives for foreign borrowing would have shown up directly
in the corporate sector. Restraints on lending—for example, to com-
mercial real estate—might have been a more successful way to cope
with the surge of capital. It was apparent that there was a significant
amount of nonproductive speculative real estate lending; imposing
sharp restrictions on this lending would have simultaneously dampened
investment and strengthened the banking system.
What would have happened if the government had maintained the
same misguided foreign exchange policy but had a better-regulated
financial sector? In this case, regulators would have limited banks'
ability to borrow short in foreign currency and lend long to buy non-
tradable assets. But the expected constancy of the exchange rate and
the differential between foreign and domestic interest rates, which was
increased by the partial sterilization of capital inflows, would have
created the same incentives to borrow short-term money from abroad.
The result could have been that corporations or nonbank financial in-
stitutions would have accessed international markets directly, instead
of via the banks. This is what happened in Indonesia, where roughly
two-thirds of the external debt to banks reporting to the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS) was incurred by the nonbank private sector,
among the highest proportions of any country in the world. No country
can or does regulate individual corporations at the level of detail that
would be required to prevent the foreign exchange and maturity mis-
matches that arose.
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In contrast to the other Southeast Asian countries. Malaysia's central
bank adopted much more prudent policies on short-term foreign bor-
rowing, so that at the end of December ! 996 its ratio of short-term debt
to reserves was 0.4, compared with 1.2 for Thailand.^" Malaysia did
not suffer as much from the failure of foreign creditors to roll over
short-term loans, and thus did not face the imminent threat of default
that brought Korea and Indonesia to the brink. Despite this fact. Ma-
laysia's crisis, whether measured by the depreciation of its exchange
rate or by its expected growth in 1998, has been just as severe of that
of Korea or Thailand. Taiwan had strong financial institutions, sound
macroeconomic policies, and an exchange rate that was widely believed
to be reasonable: its exchange rate depreciated gradually by only 20
percent/'
Well-designed bank regulations—such as risk-adjusted capital ade-
quacy standards and risk-adjusted deposit premiums—might have gone
some way toward reducing financial market vulnerabilities. For in-
stance, banks could have charged higher interest rates to borrowers
with large uncovered foreign exchange exposures and very high debt-
to-equity ratios, to reflect the greater risk. The threat ol higher interest
rates would have provided a disincentive for firms to have risky finan-
cial positions.
To the degree that better financial regulation would have been help-
ful, three observations are in order. First, countries with more advanced
institutions have found it difficult to develop regulatory frameworks
that insulate them from financial crises. Even banks in the supposedly
well-regulated advanced economies made loans not only to Korean
banks, but also directly to the chaebol, which had high debt-to-equity
ratios. As a practical matter, no government has imposed a good system
of capital adequacy. One important lacuna is that while credit risk
typically is recognized, though gauged imperfectly, market value risk
associated with changes in interest rates or risk premiums is not. Fur-
thermore, regulations do not examine total portfolio risk, including the
correlations among market risks and between market risk and credit
40. Other aspects of Malaysia's situation were comparable to other countries in East
Asia, for instance, the level of nonperforming loans. Even this may be misleading,
however, because Malaysia required larger reserves against losses, so that its banks
were in better financial positions.
41. Its trade-weighted effeetive exchange rate depreeiated by a similar amounl.
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risk. Even the United States has deliberately shied away from fully
transparent risk adequacy standards based on modern risk analysis. It
is unreasonable to expect such mechanisms of indirect control to work
effectively in developing countries.
Second, derivatives and off-balance-sheet items have complicated
the problems of designing an appropriate regulatory structure. And the
problems are all the more difficult for developing countries, because
they are likely to face a shortage of good regulators and because they
face greater risks. In both Indonesia and Korea, some firms and banks
thought they had covered positions, but the bankruptcy of the parties
providing the hedge left them exposed.*•• To ferret out these problems
would require assessing the credit risk of innumerable firms. That is
why regulators in more developed countries are switching to evaluation
of risk management systems, rather than monitoring individual trans-
actions or even portfolio positions. It is likely to be some time before
the financial institutions of developing countries can put into place
highly sophisticated risk management systems. There is some concern
that the Basle standards, by setting up a regulatory framework that does
not deal adequately with these broader and more relevant aspects of
risk, may give banks (and their depositors and investors) undue com-
fort, and may actually lead to excessive risk.
Third, given these limitations, there are arguments for a whole va-
riety of lending restrictions: not only sectoral limits, but also speed
limits and restrictions on the liability structures of the firms to which
banks lend. Greater financial sector restraints might have gone some
way toward changing the composition of capital infiows (by raising the
implicit cost or lowering the benefit of short-term borrowing) and their
use (by inhibiting the investment in real estate). Broad restraints on
international capital fiows, especially short-term fiows, justified by the
externalities imposed by such flows, could potentially have comple-
mented these policies, lengthening the duration and reducing the risk
of the infiows.
The intent of the Basle standards—to establish a "level playing
field" so that banks throughout the world would face similar stan-
dards—has come to be questioned, because different circumstances
42. Dooley (1998). The recent bailout of Long-Term Capital Management in the
United States is a reminder that such challenges face even highly sophisticated
institutions.
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may in fact necessitate different standards for different countries. There
is a basic conflict between the principle of a level playing field and the
idea that banks should face comparably low default probabilities. More
fundamental, the thrust of financial market liberalization, which has
focused on capital adequacy standards to the exclusion of broader con-
straints, such as "speed limits'" and restrictions on lending to real
estate, appears misguided. How countries that wish to maintain a robust
domestic banking system ,shou!d respond remains an open question.
Summary
We have used several thought experiments to ask what East Asian
governments should have done differently in the 1990s. The answer, at
least so far as macroeconomic policy goes, is not obvious. Macroeco-
nomic policymakers in East Asia faced many ofthe same challenges as
their counterparts elsewhere. One was the difficulty of ascertaining
whether capital flows were temporary or permanent, and if they would
be reversed: each of these cases implied different policy. The second
problem was that these governments were trying to use relatively few
instruments—fiscal policy, monetary policy, and exchange rate policy—to
achieve multiple objectives, which included not only achieving output,
current account, and inflation targets, but also changing the composition
of demand and of capital inflows. The chosen instruments were not suf-
ficiently rich to achieve these goals simultaneously. The fear of a moderate
rise in inflation and the ideological predisposition toward deferring to the
market, except in the determination ofthe exchange rate, may have con-
tributed both to creating the problem and to undermining the development
of effective solutions. The East Asian countries faced hard choices and
approached these challenges within a framework which, at the time,
seemed reasonable. There was no Pareto-dominant strategy that would
have unambiguously reduced risks, for example, and increased long-term
growth prospects.
Perhaps the most important policy lesson is this: one should not design
pt)licies—most notably, financial and capitai account liberalization—thai
only work when other policies, including macroeconomic policy, are con-
ducted flawlessly. Just as nuclear power plants are designed to take into
account human fallibility, so too should economic systems. It is even
more crucial that economic policy regimes be robust, because they must
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withstand the reality that policy decisions reflect a diversity of legitimate
interests and concerns, and may therefore result in policies that are far
from optimal in terms of standard macnx;cononiic precepts.
Furthermore, as is widely recognized, capital account liberalization
greatly increases the risk of capital surges, investment distortions, crises,
and collapses, especially in countries that lack robust financial systems.
We have tried to emphasize just how difficult it is to eliminate distortions
and build a robust financial system. Most banking systems have encoun-
tered significant problems in the past decades, and although our under-
standing of how to design a better banking system is improving, so is the
complexity of the job. Some distortions, such as the expectation of an
intemational bailout, are virtually impossible to eliminate or price prop-
erly. As a result, there is no general theoretical presumption that elimi-
nating any particular distortion will be welfare improving. This is not lo
say that liberalization is always bad. only that the case for it must rest on
pragmatic grounds: it must be shown that liberalization can be welfare
enhancing even when private decisions can lead to inefficient macroeco-
nomic imbalances. The case for financial liberalization cannot rest on a
blanket faith in the efficiency of markets.
Did the East Asian Crisis Follow the Pattern of Previous Crises?
The contention that the East Asian countries were pursuing "reason-
able'" macroeconomic policies in the years prior to the crisis is central
to the arguments in the previous section. The best way to test this theory
is to ask whether, given the knowledge at the lime, the East Asian
countries should have been able to see the problems coming. Following
the European exchange rate crises in 1992-93 and the Mexican crisis
in 1994-95, there was a large outpouring of theoretical and empirical
research on how to explain and predict currency crises, and also a few
papers on the prediction of banking crises. This literature can be used
as a measure of knowledge at the time.
We examine whether the leading prediction models for currency or
banking crises would have predicted the East Asian crisis in 1997. In
addition to the question of whether policymakers should have been
worried, this exercise can help to address two other issues. First, it
provides a useful out-of-sample test of models that are increasingly
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being examined, and even used, by financial institutions, governments,
and international organizations. Second, it offers a way to assess sys-
tematically tbe East Asian fundamentals in tbe years leading up to the
crisis. Some observers have argued that tbe fundamentals were very
sound, pointing to budget surpluses, low inflation, and sustained eco-
nomic growtb. Otbers empbasize tbe rapid growib of credit to tbe pri-
vate sector, real exchange rate appreciation, and, except in Malaysia,
tbe buildup of tbe ratio of sbort-term debt to reserves. No one has made
a convincing case as to whether tbe good fundamentals outweighed tbe
bad or vice versa. In this section we test this by asking whether these
factors added up to a crisis, using the leading prediction models.
Theoretical Models
Before discussing tbe empirical models, a brief discussion of (he
theoretical models is warranted. Several papers bave noted tbat ibe East
Asian crisis does not fit very well into eltber "first generation" or
"second generation" models of currency crises.-"^ Tbe first generation
models view a currency crisis as tbe inevitable and predictable result
of a persistent budget deficit tbat led to declining reserves.'*' Table 1
presents central budget balances in East Asia from 1990 to 1996. The
East Asian economies were in fact running substantial budget surpluses
and had increasing reserves, due to tbe inflow of capital.
Many of tbe second generation of currency models were motivated
by tbe collapse of tbe European exchange rate mecbanism in 1992 and
43. See, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998a); Krugmao (1998).
44. See Krugman (1979); Rood and Garber (1984).
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tbe Mexican crisis of 1994-95.•*' Tbe most important feature of tbese
models is that governments did not bave to devalue (tbe unique equilib-
rium of tbe first generation models), but were tempted to devalue, often
in order to temporarily boost aggregate demand and lower unemploy-
ment. Tbe costs and benefits of devaluing as opposed to maintaining
tbe pegged rate depend not only on tbe current rate of unemployment
but also on the market's expectation of tbe probability of a devaluation.
Tbe strategic interaction between policymakers and market expectations
can lead to multiple equilibria, depending on tbe model and tbe value
of tbe fundamentals. If tbe market expects a peg to fall, speculators
will attack, and thus make it too costly for the government to maintain
tbe peg. If tbe speculators expect tbat it will be maintained, tbey will
not attack and tbe peg will be maintained.
The essential insigbt tbat currency attacks can be self-fulfilling is
consistent witb tbe East Asian experience. But tbese particular models
do not explain wby the East Asian countries were vulnerable to a self-
fulfilling withdrawal of confidence, for at least three reasons. First,
from tbe perspective of aggregate demand, tbe East Asian countries did
not face an especially large temptation to devalue, Tbe unemployment
rate in Korea (tbe only country for wbicb we bave reliable data) was
around 2 percent until tbe crisis struck, and GDP growth was strong in
all of these countries. Second, tbe second generation models empbasize
the (possibly transitory) benefits of a devaluation. East Asia's corpo-
rations and banks bad substantial foreign excbange exposure, bowever,
and tbe banking sector was relatively weak. As a result, tbe option of
devaluation bad a large potential—and subsequemly, actual—cost in
terms of weakening tbe financiai system, leading to a collapse of credit
and a large fall in aggregate demand. Third, the East Asian countries
bad little choice about devaluation.
Should Crises Be Unpredictable?
Dozens of empirical models have been developed to predict currency
crises, and a few to predict banking crises. Tbese models are typically
motivated by the theories discussed above. Before we examine wbetber
these models predict tbe East Asian crisis, it is itnportant to ask whether
45. See Obstfeld (1994. 1996); Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993); Jeanne (1997);
Cole and Kehoe (1996).
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models sbould be able to predict crises in general. It is often argued
tbat tbe efficient markets bypothesis, wbich says tbat stock prices should
be unpredictable, also implies tbat currency crises sbould be unpre-
dictable. Accordingly, if one figured out bow to predict currency crises
they would take place earlier and more smoothly, and tbe relationsbip
between tbe predictors and tbe crisis would disappear as soon as it was
observed. Tbe reason why tbis argument is wrong is tbat one is not
trying to predict the expected change in the exchange rate, but the
probability tbat a dramatic cbange will take place.**
A simple example can illustrate this point. Suppose someone devel-
oped a model that predicted, based on several observable variables, that
a currency would witb certainty devalue by 25 percent next month. Tbis
would provide a massive profit opportunity tbat would eitber bring tbe
crisis earlier or, wben the model became known, erase the relationship
between those observable variables and currency crises. But none of
the standard crisis prediction models predict crises witb certainty. In-
stead tbey say, for instance, tbat tbere is a 10 percent chance tbat tbe
peg will not bold, in which case tbe currency will devalue by 25 percent.
If this were widely known, the interest rate in the country would rise
to tbe point tbat tbe expected return to bolding tbe currency was equal
to tbe expected return to holding, say, dollars. As a result, making the
prediction would not necessarily bring the crisis any earlier or undo the
effectiveness of tbe observed relationsbips in the future.^'
In our assessment of forecasting models we focus on four tbat are
among tbe most cited and span the methodological range: tbose due to
Jeffrey Sachs. Aaron Tornell, and Andres Velasco; Graciela Kaminsky,
Saul Lizondo. and Reinbart; Frankel and Rose; and Demirgug-Kunt and
Detragiacbe. The first three deal with currency crises; tbe last, witb
banking crises. All were developed and estimated before tbe Hast Asian
46. In other words, one is not forecasting expected returns, which by the efficient
markets hypothesis should be unpredictable, but volatility, which may be predictable.
Indeed, ihe large literature estimating ARCH-type (that is, autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticiiy) models of asset markets is based on the premise that volatility is
systematically predictable.
47. In Krugman (1979) crises are predictable with complete certainty because they
do not entail any capital gains or losses. At the date of the speculative attack, speculators
buy all of the central bank's reserves and the exchange rate floats, drifting down over
time. Because the exchange rate does not jump, (here is no profit opportunity. A model
that implies that no one makes or loses money, bowever, seems to miss tbe most salient
feature of a crisis.
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crisis. In tbe text we present only the most important results of tbis
exercise; we describe tbe models and our estimations in more detail in
appendix A.''*'
Real Exchange Rate Appreciation in East Asia: A Digression
One tbread that runs tbrougb many of the theoretical and empirical
models of currency crises in developing countries, including the tbree
tbat we assess, is tbe real appreciation of tbe excbange rate relative to
its equilibrium value. Since tbe outbreak of the East Asian crisis, many
observers have sought to fit it into tbe mold of the "normal" crisis, by
emphasizing tbe appreciation of real exchange rates in all tbe affected
countries, witb tbe exception of Korea. Before evaluating tbe models,
it is worthwhile to evaluate tbis one variable.
The general relationsbip between real appreciations and economic
crises has been widely analyzed, most notably by Edwards and by
Rudiger Dornbuscb. Ilan Goldfajn, and Rodrigo Valdds.^" Tbe argu-
ment is that real appreciation, which often results from tbe use of a
fixed nominal exchange rate as a nominal ancbor to bring down infla-
tion, leads to growing current account deficits, increasing financial
strain, and costly financiat crises. Goldfajn and Valdes follow up on
the latter point in a study which tinds tbat only 10 percent of countries
with a 25 percent real appreciation bave returned witbout a nominal
excbange rate crasb. and no country witb a real excbange rate appre-
ciation of 35 percentormorehasmanaged this transition successfully.™
In tbe context of the East Asian crisis, many observers bave noted
tbat tbe dollar rose 50 percent against tbe yen between 1995 and 1997.^'
48. Sachs. Tomell. and Velasco (1996); Kaminsky. Lizondo. and Reinbart (1998);
Frankel and Ro.se (1996): Demirguv-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a). Note that both of
the models published in 1998 were estimated using pre-1997 data, and neither differs
very much from Ihe working paper versions written before the outbreak of the crisis;
thus the experience of 1997 provides a legitimate out-of-sample test for both. Berg and
Pattillo (1998) performed an analysis of the predictive power of the three currency crisis
models simultaneously with ours, and tbeir assessment is very similar.
49. Edwards (1989); Dornbusch. Goldfajn. and Valdes (1995).
50. Goldfajn and Valdes (1996).
51. China's 50 percent devaluation in 1994 is sometinies cited as an explanation for
tbis effective real appreciation. The devaluation only covered the official exchange rate,
however; roughly HO percent ot exports were covered by tbe "swap market" exchange
rate, which remained essentially unaffected. As a result, the effective devaluation was
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Those countries with de facto dollar pegs, including Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Tbailand, tbus saw tbeir trade-weighted real excbange
rates rise. In contrast, Indonesia allowed its excbange rate to depreciate
witb its infiation rate and saw a relatively small real appreciation, and
Korea, wbicb pursued an even more fiexible exchange rate policy,
actually saw a real depreciation.
This trough to peak comparison is potentially misleading. In 1995
the dollar was at an historic low relative to the yen. Given that the Thai
babt and the other currencies bad been effectively pegged to tbe dollar
for some time, a portion of their rise vis-a-vis tbe yen in tbe following
years would simply bave been correcting tbis imbalance. Wben the real
exchange rates are compared with earlier values, tbe real appreciation
is substantially smaller.
To assess real excbange rate misalignment requires a measure of the
actual real excbange rate and a metbod for estimating tbe equilibrium
real exchange rate. Since both of these are very contentious, the most
prudent course is to use a variety of estimates together witb subjective
judgments about tbe direction of cbange of tbe equilibrium real ex-
change rate. Tbe most significant effort to do tbis for East Asia is due
to Menzie Chinn, and we rely on bis estimates along with our own."
Table 2 sbows four estimates of tbe degree of real excbange rate
misalignment in selected countries. Tbe first column is an estimate
based on purcbasing power parity (PPP). using tbe average real ex-
change rate over 1989-91 as the base period. Tbe cboice of tbis base
is motivated by tbe fact tbat. at least for the East Asian economies, real
exchange rates were virtually flat in this period, wbicb was also marked
by relative tranquillity in terms of major macroeconomic events." Any
only 7 to 8 percent. Furthermore. China's real (trade-weighted) excbange rate in mid-
1997 was substantially appreciated relative lo its value before the exchange rate unili-
cation in 1994. See World Bank (1998a. p. 24).
52. Chinn (1998).
53. This column is based on an unpublished multilateral trade-weighted real ex-
change rate index that uses the consumer price index (CPI) and is calculated by World
Bank staff, based on IMF data. Various other measures of tbe real exchange rate—
including bilateral U.S. dollar using CPIs. bilateral U.S. dollar using whole.sale prices,
multilateral trade with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries, and the J, P. Morgan effective exchange rate index—are all very
similar to these. In the ca.se of Thailand, for instance, altemative measures of the
appreciation for the first half of 1997 relative to the 1989-91 average range from 3
percent to 11 percent.
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2. Measures of Real Exchange Rale Misalignment for Selected Countries


































































Soutre. PPP-1 and nJjustcd per tHpiia GDP arc luihcic^' ciilctilaliuns based on ihe PPP series in Wurid Bank 11991k) and
a muliilaleral Irailc-weighted real cKchangi: rate from unputilishcd World Bank staff estimaiet usin^ IMF dala PPP-2 and
Ihc monetary model arc estimated hy Chinn < 19'>S)
a Pcrccnugc change between teal exchange rate average over 1*189-^ I and average nver January lo June 19Q7.
b Overvalualion of the real e<;chan^e rate in May \'i'il relative to Chinn's csttmale of the PPP etchange raic nvei 1973-
tt,.
c. Percentage ilifrcrence between actual real exchange rate in \Wfi anJ the predicted rale for Ihal year bused on the litted
valuer trom the rcgre<isKin of Ihe real eithange lati; on pei capila GDP measured in PPPilollurs. The ucluul reiii e»-hiingc
iMe \!. Ihc tatki of ihc PPP rate to Ihe dollar exchange rule m 19'>(i. as cakulatcd by Ihc World Bunk.
d. Overvaluation of real eichange raw in May !<)97 based on Chinn's Micky price monetary model of the exchange rate
base period is necessarily ad hoc. The second column shows an alter-
native measure of purchasing power parity misalignment calculated by
Chinn, which essentially uses the average from the period 1975-96 as
the equilibrium real rate. The third column compares real exchange
rates (in this case, the PPP adjustment factors used by the World Bank,
which capture the relative price of tradables and nontradables) in 1996
with the value that would have been predicted by a regression on the
level of per capita GDP, a measure that is based on the Balassa-
Samuelson effect.'"' The fourth column is Chinn's estimate of rea! mis-
alignment derived from fitting a sticky price monetary model."
Two results emerge from this analysis. First, and most striking, if
54. Balassa (1964); Samuelson (1964).
55. Chinn (1998) essentially estimates a system with a money demand equalion. an
uncovered interest parity equation, and an adjustment process for prices. Tbese equations
are adjusted to reflect the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
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real exchange rate appreciation is defined as the critical variable af-
fecting the likelihood of a crisis, the countries that actually experienced
crises would seem not to have been the most vulnerable. Second, the
degree of real misalignment is very sensitive to the measure used.
Compared to their stage of development, the East Asian countries
actually had real exchange rates well below what one would have
expected.^''
There are several other developments that could have changed the
relationship between equilibrium exchange rates and actual exchange
rates in ways not captured by the above theories. For instance, Korea
saw its terms of trade decline by 20 percent in the three years up to
June 1997. Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand reduced tariff
rates on imports between 1990 and 1996-97.^' Even more significant
steps were taken on the capital account to open up to capital inflows
and to encourage certain types of inflow. Taken together, however,
these various effects are not likely to have a large quantitative impact
on the results in table 2.
It is almost a tautology that countries with vastly overvalued ex-
change rates are more likely to experience a crisis, that is, a large
decline in their exchange rates. But as a practical matter, determining
the magnitude ofthe overvaluation ex ante is not easy. Different meth-
odologies yield not only different magnitudes but different signs. The
exchange rates of some of the countries that suffered crises were some-
what overvalued, although perhaps less so even than is indicated by the
relatively modest rise in actual real exchange rates. Nor are their actual
overvaluations very large compared with many other countries that did
not suffer crises. In contrast, by the same measures Korea probably had
an undervalued exchange rate. Based on this variable alone, there is no
reason to think that the adjustment process could have been much
smoother, either through gradual exchange rate changes or price
changes. Also, the analysis of the real exchange rate makes it very
difficult to explain nominal devaluations well in excess of any estimate
of real overvaluation.
56. From the perspective of cross-country fit. the rate adju.sted for per capita GDP
is by far Ihe best, with an R^ of 0.82.
57. For Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia, see World Bank (1998c); for Thailand, see
the more recent data and analysis in Martin (1998).
40 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1998
The Unpredictability of the East Asian Currency Crisis
We look first at the model of Erankel and Rose, which predicts the
probability of a currency crisis as a function of (possibly lagged) macro-
economic and financial variables.^*' They define a "currency crash" as
an event where the annual exchange rate vis-<i-vis the U.S. dollar drops
by more than 25 percent in a single year; this drop is at least 10 per-
centage points greater than that of the previous year, to exclude high
inflation cases: and there have been no crises within a three-year win-
dow, to exclude counting the same crisis more than once. By this
definition, currency crashes occurred 7.0 percent of the time In our
sample of 104 countries over 1980-96 (see appendix A). Thus a very
simple model is that crises are idiosyncratic events that occur with
probability of 7.0 percent in any given year, independent of the past
history of crises or the values of any other variables.
Presumably, however, one would be able to do better by looking at
the data on East Asia. Frankel and Rose attempt this approach by
estimating a probit model based on pooled data from a large sample of
countries and periods. They include a wide range of explanatory vari-
ables, the most robustly significant—in terms of increasing the proba-
bility of a crisis—of which are a low share of foreign direct investment
as a fraction of total debt, a low re serve-to-import ratio, high domestic
credit growth. low GDP growth, and high foreign interest rates. They
find little evidence for the importance of short-term debt, overall debt,
the government budget deficit, or overvaluation of the exchange rate.
We fit the fuli Frankel and Rose model to data from crises during
1980-96 and then construct fitted values for the probability of -a crisis
in 1997 using the 1996 values of the right-hand-side variables (data
sources and regression results are given in appendix A).**^  Table 3 shows
the predicted probabilities of a crisis according to this model; boldface
indicates that a country suffered a crisis under the Frankel-Rose
definition.''"
58. Frankel and Rose (1996).
59. When 1996 data are unavailable, we use 1995 data. When neither year is avail-
able, the predicted probability is omilted.
6(). There is a very strong correlation between having insufticieni data with which
to fit the crisis probability and suffering a large devaluation: oi'lhc eleven countries wilh
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3. Predicted Probabilities of a Currency Crisis in 1997 Using the Model of
l^ankel and Rose-*
Probahitiiy of crisis'' Countries'
Greater than 12 percent Venezuela, South Africa
Between 9 and 12 percent Panama, Jordan. Argentina. Cameroon
Between 6 and 9 percent Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Belize. Mexico. Costa
Rica. Turkey. Peru. Mauritius. Madaga.scar. Philippines
Between 3 and 6 percent Thailand. Poland, Malaysia. Pakistan. Sri Lanka.
Indonesia. Dominican Republic, £1 Salvador, Uruguay.
Seychelles
Less than 3 percent India. Fiji. Nicaragua, Guatemala. St. Vincent and the
Grenadines. Chile. Bolivia. China, Botswana. Nepal
Source Ajlhors' caltulBtions usinj! Ihc mitlel iif Krankei and Rose itWfil. based i>n ttula fiom Wiirld Bunk
I99t(c). Iniernanoniil fmoniial Siarisricx. and Ihc teal exchange rule sche\ described In table 1.
a. See appendu A fiir Jeiails.
b. The uni;uni|JiLun!il probability oi a cnsts js T 0 perceni Predicted probubiliiies (or Ihc BJI^I AMan cuuniriei; in 1997
arc. Ihc Phllipplni's. ft. I perceni: Thailand, .5.B pcrceni; Malaysia, 4.tt percent. lnduncsi:i. A.S perceni.
c. Wilhin categunes, counlrie^ are lifted from highest probability (u IOWESI. Counlries in boldface surfereil a crisis based
on Ihe detinition of Frankel and Rose,
Given the data and the model, we would revise down the probability
of a crisis in East Asia to below the 7.0 percent predictioti of the
idiosyncratic crisis model. In ail four ofthe East Asian crisis countries
for which we have sufficient data, the predicted probability of a crisis
is well below 7.0 percent. Thustotheextent that past patterns continued
to hold in 1997, one would have been quite sanguine about East Asia's
prospects in 1997.
This exercise has implications not only for the Frankel and Rose
specification, but for models based on macroeconomic aggregates more
generally. One can treat the Frankel and Rose regression as a very
general reduced form for predicting crises based on the values of several
variables, rather than considering these authors' specific underlying
structural model. From this perspective. Its failure creates the presump-
tion that most models based on historical relationships between macro-
economic aggregates, capital flow data, and currency crises would not
have predicted the Asian crisis. From the experience of the past two
decades, the economic indicators in the East Asian economies simply
were not very worrisome.
exchange rate data that show a currency crash in 1997. only four have sufficient 1995
or 1996 data to form the estimated prohability.
42 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1998
The Unpredictability ofthe East Asian Banking Crisis
There are very few systematic prediction models for banking crises.
Among these, that of Demirgu^-Kunt and Detragiache is one of the few
tobeessentially completed prior to the East Asian crisis/'' Like Frankel
and Rose, these authors use a limited dependent variable framework,
but estimated using a logit model, with a pooled data set of the proba-
bility of a banking crisis as a function of some of the standard macro-
economic and financial variables, along with an index ofthe quality of
law enforcement. They find that the most important predictors of bank-
ing crises are macroeconomic factors (low GDP growth and high infla-
tion), high real interest rates, vulnerability to capital outflows, domestic
Hnancial liberalization, and ineffective law enforcement."' Some of
these factors—high real interest rates, domestic financial liberalization,
and vulnerability to capital outflows—were present in the East Asian
countries that experienced a crisis, but many were not: growth was
strong, inflation was low, and according to the International Country
Risk Guide, the quality of law enforcement was high.
In the model, the unconditional probability of a banking crisis is 4.7
percent. In a subsequent paper, the authors assess the model's ability
to predict the crisis in East Asia; the fitted probabilities of a crisis are
given in table 4 . " As with the Frankel-Rose model, each of the fore-
casted probabilities is below the unconditional probability of a crisis.
Again, a simpie prediction that one out of every twenty years brings a
crisis would have done better in East Asia than a prediction that took
account of the data. Strikingly, even if one had predicted the macro-
economic crisis in 1997. including the extent of exchange rate depre-
61. Demirgu;;-Kuni and Deiragiache (199aa). Eichengreen and Rose (1998) present
a very similar model and similar findings, with the additional resull Ihal lower growth
rales in the OECD and higher interest rate.s in major OECD lending countries increase
the probability of a crisis. In assessing their model's predictive power for ihe East Asian
crisis, they claim some success lor detecting Thailand's problems, allhough "other cases
like Indonesia and South Korea are more difficult . . . to reconcile with our results"
(p, 30). Note also Goldstein and Turner (1996); Honohan (1997),
62. Interestingly, they find no evidence that depreciation of the currency increases
the probability of a banking crisis. One explanation is ihal while Ihere is no reason why
hanks should maintain unhedged currency positions, as maturity transformers they can-
not completely hedge again.si unexpected changes in real interest rales.
63. Demirgu(;-Kunt and Detragiache (1998c), Note thai the probabilities using lore-
ca.sts of 1997 data are almost exactly the same as those using actual values of 1996 data,
which is the procedure we used to assess the other models.
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4. Predicted Probabilities of a Banking Crisis in 1997 Using the Model of
Demirgij^-Kunt and Detragiache*
Percent






Source, Dcmirjiuij-Kunt and Deirsgiathe I IWSt),
«, Note [hat ificsc pr<ibabilitici ate baMJ an a -.lightly different model Ihan the same authon' model discussed in the te^l,
b. Estimalcil using Consensus Korccasis I lWHI orthe forecasis from Imernational Monetary Funill l'*97|fot 1997 valuet
of Ihe righ|.hund-Mde variables. The uncnndilional pmbability ai a batiling crisi\ is 4.7 perceni.
ciation and slowdown In growth, one would have been very worried
about banking crises only in Indonesia and Thailand.^ "*
Did Leading Indicators Sound the Alarm?
The majority of the crisis prediction models developed in the past
year, especially those used by practitioners, have relied on a leading
indicators approach. In part, this flurry of interest in leading indicator
models has been driven by the perceived partial success of Kaminsky,
Lizondo, and Reinhart's model,"
Kaminsky. Lizondo, and Reinhart define a crisis as an attack on the
currency, whether successful or not/'' They select several potential
leading indicators of currency crises and then use past data to obtain
percentile thresholds for each indicator that maximize the signal-to-
noise ratio. For real exchange rate misalignment, for instance, they
estimate a percentile threshold of 90 percent. That is, when a country's
64. This is somewhat unfair. Because Demirgu<;-Kunt and Deiragiache use annual
data, (hese evenis do not show up very strongly, especially for Korea, where the crisis
occurred late in the year. A monthly version of the model would probably have done
much better. Yet to the extent that financial crises cause economic slowdowns, the use
of contemporaneous data makes it even harder to interpret the results as indicative of
causation.
65. Kaminsky. Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998).
66. Specifically, in defining a crisis Kaminsky. Lizondo. and Reinhart take tbe
weighted average of the one-month nominal depreciation (with respect to the dollar)
minus the one-month percentage ehange in reserves. The weights are set to equalize tbe
variances of the two series. Their cutoff for a crisis is when this index rises three standard
deviations above its mean for that country. We consider a crisis in any month of 1997
as a crisis for 1997.
44 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 2:1998
real exchange rate is within the highest 10 percent of its experience of
overappreciation. it signals the possibility of a crisis; otherwise it does
not.
This approach has several theoretical drawbacks. Most serious, in
the context of assessing the model's predictions ofthe East Asian crisis,
is the fixed effects specification. Rather than adopting a common thresh-
old for each country (for example, when the current account deficit is
over 8 percent), they designate a common percentile threshold (for
example, when the current account deficit is in the worst 10 percent of
its historical range). But if a country has consistently run a current
account deficit of 8 percent of GDP. that does not necessarily mean that
this "normal" level is not worrisome. Furthermore, many of their
indicators are rates of growth; for example, growth in the ratio of M2
to reserves or in the ratio of domestic credit to GDP. As a result, even
if there should be fixed effects in levels, they would not be needed
when using growth rates.
Take the case of real appreciation. Based on the ninetieth percentile
cutoff for a warning indicator, which is common to all countries, the
numerical threshold would be a 33 percent overappreciation in Argen-
tina. 26 percent in Brazil. 19 percent in Mexico. 13 percent in the
Philippines. 11 percent in Korea. 7 percent in Indonesia, and only 6
percent in Malaysia and Thailand. Thus even a very modest real appre-
ciation would show up as a crisis signal for the East Asian countries.
Analogous results hold for most ofthe other indicators. Therefore this
fixed effect means that the indicators will overpredict crises in countries
with good histories (like those in East Asia) and underpredict them in
countries with bad histories. This particular fiaw clearly biases the
model in favor of being able to predict the East Asian crisis.
Implicit in their framework is the hypothesis that a country that has
experienced relatively little change in a variable in the past is more
prone to a crisis than other countries if that variable changes only
modestly. Although this may contain a grain of truth, the actual danger
thresholds that it implies in practice seem unreasonably low for coun-
tries with good past behavior.
Kaminsky. Lizondo. and Reinhart identify twelve indicators that
have predictive content for currency crises.*•' Based on these variables
67. One of ihe variables, "excess Ml balances." is impossible to construct from
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Table 5. Potential Currency Crises in December 1996 by Warning Indicators,
Using the Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart Modeh
Number of indicators^ Countries'
5 Bulgaria
4 South Africa
3 Brazil. India, Kenya. Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan
2 Argentina. Bangladesh, Chile. Colombia, China. Czech
Republic, Indonesia. Lithuania, Morocco. Nigeria,
Philippines. Poland. Russian Federation. Taiwan. Turkey,
Venezuela
I Egypt. Ghana, Israel, Jamaica. Jordan, Mexico, Slovak
Republic. Slovenia, Sri Lanka. Tunisia, Zimbabwe
0 Botswana, C6te d'lvoire. Ecuador. Mauritius. Peru. Trinidad
and Tobago
Source: Authiirs' cnlculalion* using model of Kaminsky. Li^onJo, and Rcintiart (19981. bascJ on dala Imm Inifrnaiional
Financial Staiixiict and ihc real exchange rale series described in table 2,
a. See appendix A Tor detail!.,
b. Oul of a Idtul of eleven, Nole that mil all mditalors exist for every counlry,
c. Counirtcs in biililfacc suffeted a crisis based on Iht definition of kamisky. Uziindo. and Reinharl,
and the thresholds that these authors identify, the main warning indi-
cators for the East Asian countries in December 1996 were real appre-
ciation of exchange rates (Indonesia. Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand), rapid domestic credit growth rates (Indonesia. Korea, and
the Philippines), falling stock markets (Korea and Thailand), slowing
export growth rates (Thailand), rising M2 multipliers (Malaysia), terms
of trade (Korea), and real interest rates (Malaysia). Although real ap-
preciation. M2 multiplier growth, domestic credit growth, and real
interest rates were all worrisome relative to the East Asian economies
historically, they appear more normal in comparison with those of other
developing countries.'''* Table 5 compares countries in terms of the
number of indicators signaling a crisis; countries that suffered crises in
1997 according to the Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart definition are
shown in boldface.
Overall, the Kaminsky. Lizondo. and Reinhart framework would
have done better in predicting the East Asian crisis than the two other
the information tbey provide. We omit it in table 5. but it is unlikely that its inclusion
would change the results very much.
68. In contrast. Thailand's domestic credit growth was ihc one indicator ihal signaled
vulnerabilily compared with other developing countries, but noi relative to its own
history.
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models discussed above. We have three important caveats: there are a
lot of noisy signals; the East Asian countries did not seem too bad in
most of the relevant variables; and most important, the construction of
the model makes it much more likely to predict—and generally to
overpredict—crises in regions which, like East Asia, have a history of
good fundamentals.
It is also important to realize that even if the indicators approach
were consistently successful in predicting crises, these indicators may
not be causing the crisis. This may limit the direct policy relevance of
this approach. For instance, a falling stock market may anticipate a
crisis because it reflects market expectations, rather than playing any
causal role in the onset of the crisis. If the government took steps to
stop the decline in the stock market, it would not be addressing the
underlying cause ofthe crisis. Besides, reversing the market's decline
might be impossible.
Did the East Asian Crisis Follow the Mexican Pattern?
The three models discussed above for the most part find that the East
Asian crisis did not follow the "average" patterns of currency or bank-
ing crises over the past two decades. This should not be very surprising.
The East Asian economies had virtually nothing in common with the
large public sector debt, large deficits, and rampant inflation that char-
acterized many Latin American countries (but not Chile) in the 1980s.
It is harder to argue that the East Asian crisis differed from the
Mexican crisis and its spreading effects in 1994-95. Chang and Ve-
lasco. for instance, contend that the East Asian "crash is not a new and
frightening creature . . . but a classic financial crisis, the likes of which
we have seen before in so-called emerging markets. Chile in 1982 and
Mexico in 1994 provide the clearest, but by no means the only, prece-
dents."*"** There are many similarities among variables in the run-ups
to the Mexican and the East Asian crises, including large capital in-
flows, budget surpluses, rapid growth of credit to the private sector,
real exchange rate appreciation, and. in most East Asian countries, the
buildup of ratios of short-term debt to reserves.
However, there are good reasons for thinking that the East Asian
economies were different from Mexico. Most important is the East
69, Chang and Velasco (1998. p. I). Tortiell (1998) makes the same argument.
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Asian economies' long track record of prudent macroeconomic policies
and exceptionally successful macroeconomic performance. Current cir-
cumstances were also different. The East Asian countries had a sub-
stantially sinaller stock of government debt and net external debt than
Mexico had at the onset of its crisis. Furthermore, as was widely re-
marked on at the time. East Asia did not see nearly the same degree of
real appreciation as Mexico had earlier.
Once again, the only way to advance the argument about the quan-
titative significance ofthe similarities and differences between the East
Asian and the Mexican crises is to aggregate them through an accepted
empirical model. The most cited model of the Tequila crisis is that of
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco.'" These authors seek to explain not the
onset of a crisis in the initial country (that is. Mexico in 1994), but its
severity and the scope of its spread. They measure severity by the
weighted average of the fall in the nominal exchange rate and the loss
in reserves, with the weights set to equalize the contribution of each of
these measures to the variance of the index.
The model has two key variables; fundamentals and reserve ade-
quacy. Fundamentals depend on real exchange rate appreciation and
growth in credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP, a proxy for
weaknesses in the banking system. Reserve adequacy is proxied by the
ratioof M2 to reserves." Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco argue that there
is no incentive to attack a country with good fundamentals, because in
the event of a successful attack its currency will not decline by very
much. They also argue that there is no incentive to attack countries
with enough reserves to defend their exchange rates. As a result, only
countries with both bad fundamentals and inadequate reserves are sus-
ceptible to attack."'- The severity ofthe crisis will be proportional to the
level ofthe fundamentals.
70. Sachs. Tornell. and Velasco (1996).
71. The choice of ihis variable is motivated by the fact ihal as well as foreign
speculation, capital flight has been a key feature of balance of payments crises. With
capital convertibility, the entire assets of a country potentially can be converted into
foreign currency and moved abroad. Focusing on M2 emphasizes the liquid assets that
might most immediately precipitate a balance of payments crisis,
72. They adopt arbitrary and very broad definitions of bad fundamentals and inad-
equate reserves. According to their definition, a country has bad fundamentals when its
real exchange rate appreciation and lending boom are below the lowest quartile of the
sample of twenty countries. The cutoff on the exchange rate variable is thus set at a 16
48 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1998
They confirm their hypotheses (including the interaction effects) and
test for robustness with several different variants of the model. Most
remarkable, in their benchtiiark specification they find an R- of 69
percent and an R' of 57 percent. Therefore this model provides a very
good description of the Tequila crisis in 1994-95. To the degree that it
does not describe the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, one could infer that
the two episodes are different (or that the fit of the Tequila crisis was
spurious).
To test this, we first run the Sachs. Tornell, and Velasco regression
for the 1997-98 crisis (regression results are presented and discussed
in appendix A). The only meaningful combination of coefficients that
is significant and of the correct sign indicates that a lending boom in a
country with weak fundamentals and inadequate reserves increases the
probability of a crisis. The degree of real appreciation in countries with
weak fundamentals and inadequate reserves is also marginally signifi-
cant, with a/j value of 0.12, but ofthe wrong sign: greater real appre-
ciation reduces the severity of a crisis. The other variables are insig-
nificant. Most important, the R~ is 5 percent and the R- is - 16 percent.
For no specification—removing outliers and using ditferent cutoffs for
the dummy variables and the growth of the other variables and different
ending periods for the crisis—were we able to get results that were
close to those of Sachs. Tornell. and Velasco."
Second, we use the coefficients from the 1996 paper to form a "pre-
dicted index" of the severity of the crises in the East Asian countries
in 1997. We then compare these values with the actual crisis values.
The correlation between the actual and predicted severity of the crises
percent real depreciation. In other words, any country Ihat has seen its real exchange
rate depreciate by less than 16 percent (which includes every country that has witnessed
a real appreciation) is. under their defmition, potentially subject to a currency crisis.
Similarly, the cutotf on the lending boom suggests that virtually any country that bas
seen credit to ihe private sector grow more rapidly than GDP will be at risk of a crisis—
a very broad definition of vulnerability.
73, Tornell has rerun the Sachs. Tornell, and Velasco regression for the current
crisis episode and finds that '"the rule that links fundamenials to crises' severity has
been the same in both the Tequila and Asian crises" (199X. p. I), Between his paper
and ours, the regressions differ in the definition and timing of the variables; we stick
more closely to the original paper, whereas Tornell includes u number of refinements.
Running the specification used in both the original paper and the present paper on the
similar but independently developed data set from Corsetti, Pcsenti. andRoubini (1998a)
yields results similar to ours.
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is 0.10 and is statistically insignificant at any reasonable level. This
should not be surprising. There is virtually no relationship between the
depth of the crisis and the Sachs. Tornell, and Velasco variables when
the coefficients are chosen to maximize the fit in this crisis; the rela-
tionship using historically determined coefficients will be that much
worse. Had policymakers used the Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco model
in the summer of 1997, it would not have offered any useful guidance
about the depth and scope of the impending crises.
Summary
Our theoretical and empirical analysis strengthens the presutDption
that the East Asian crisis was a novel event and that, given the knowl-
edge at the time, it probably could not have been predicted. This is not
because crises are always, as a matter of theory, unpredictable. Instead,
it is because the East Asian experience is not an example ofthe standard
crisis, the inevitable result of declining macroeconomic fundamentals
or the temptation to devalue. There is little evidence that real exchange
rate appreciation played more than a very small role, if any. The rapid
growth of domestic credit and high ratios of short-term debt to reserves
clearly resulted in weaker and more vulnerable economies. But as mea-
sured by models developed before the crisis, the quantitative magni-
tudes of these weaknesses do not add up to a crisis.
The above analysis helps to explain why the East Asian crisis was
not predicted by the affected countries, by international investors (as
evidenced by the falling risk premiums and rising loan volumes leading
up to the crisis), or by credit raters. Nevertheless, this failure is dis-
turbing: there is no general analog to the efficient markets hypothesis
to say that crises should necessarily be unpredictable. And the growing
understanding and experience should make them all the more predict-
able.
One explanation of this puzzle is that there are a great variety of
financial crises, each with different causes and consequences. The East
Asian variety was either new or sufficiently rare that it was not
predicted.
Another explanation comes from the multiple equilibria stories. Often
in these models, countries with good fundamentals are not susceptible to
crises, those with very bad fundamentals will certainly suffer from crises.
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and those in between will be vulnerable to a given probability of a crisis.
On average, therefore, one should be able to predict crises, in a stochastic
sense. However, the predictive power is empirically weak. These resulls
could be described as saying that something like three-quarters of countries
have fundamentals bad enough that they are vulnerable to a crisis. It is
likely that more refined models will do a better job of identifying vulner-
able countries, but given current knowledge, there is little basis for claim-
ing that crises are the inevitable punishment (that is, a unique equilibrium)
for mismanagement, especially since one cannot define mismanagement
in any empirically robust manner.
A third possibility is that the policy response to impending economic
problems has a large effect on whether these evolve into large but
transitory shocks or serious crises. Had the East Asian countries handled
interest rate policy differently, for instance, they might not have seen
a crisis of this magnitude. Under this hypothesis, the existence and
depth of a crisis are not necessarily determined by the lagged varia-
bles—at least, not the ones examined by the standard models.
Finally, conventional interpretations of what it means to be misman-
aged have little basis either in theory or in historical experience. For
instance, most theoretical models attempting to assess whether a coun-
try is likely to encounter troubles focus more on state variables—that
is, the level of debt or reserves—than on flow variables, except to the
extent that flow variables are the consequence of underlying state var-
iables. State variables are associated with solvency, and flow variables
with liquidity. In the presence of market imperfections such as liquidity
constraints, the flow variables might matter. But typically, models fo-
cusing on flow variables do not identify the source of those imperfee-
tions, let alone theirconsequencesorhow they might best be addressed.
Although theorists have long felt uneasy about the seemingly ad hoc
models that policy advisers employ in these contexts, the presumption
has been that their insights into the evidence compensate for deficien-
cies in theory. Our empirical findings cast doubt on that presumption.
The Ratio of Shorl-Term Debt to Reserves
So far, we have restricted our attention to models that were essen-
tially completed prior to the East Asian crisis. The failure of these
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models to explain the East Asian episode has led to a search for new
explanatory variables. Perhaps the most frequently mentioned is the
ratio of short-term debt to reserves. Although this is often cited as one
of the causes of Mexico's crisis in 1994-95, when the short-term debt
was primarily public, it is not central to the systematic empirical pre-
diction papers, which rarely consider the composition of capital. One
exception is that of Frankel and Rose, who include short-term debt as
a fraction of total debt in their currency crisis regressions, but they do
not find that it is significant.^^ Using a similar methodology and data
set. Barry Eichengreen and Rose find that a larger share of short-term
debt decreases the probability of a banking crisis.^^ Sachs. Tornell. and
Velasco also add the ratio of short-term debt to GDP to their benchmark
regression described above and find ambiguous evidenee suggesting
that it might increase the severity of a crisis.
Predictive Power for Recent Crises
Since the East Asian crisis, short-term debt has assumed new im-
portance in discussions of the onset of crises, and also as a variable in
predictive models, The preferred transformation is the ratio of short-
term debt to reserves. This indicator emphasizes the fact that virtually
any country that has more short-term debt than reserves can suffer a
self-fulfilling balance of payments crisis if its creditors refuse to roll
over loans.'"
The ability of this variable, by itself, to predict the crises of 1997 is
remarkable. Figure 6 shows that at the end of 1996, eleven of the forty-
two developing countries for which data are available had ratios of
short-term debt (to BIS-reporting banks) to reserves greater than I. In
addition to Indonesia (with a ratio of 1.9), Korea (2.0). and Thailand
74. Frankel and Rose (1996).
75. Eichengreen and Rose (1998). An explanation for this finding is that shon-term
capiial is like a tight leash, giving the lender an incentive and a tool to influence the
behavior of the borrower, and giving the borrower, because of the greater consequences
of acrisi.s, an incentive to act more prudently. It is puzzling, however, thaithis indirect
effect outweigh.s the direct effect of greater risk.
76. Almost all of the accounts of the East Asian crisis discussed above emphasize
short-term debt. Radelet and Sachs (1998a) find that ihc ratio of shon-term debt to
reserves is a statistically significant predictor of financial crisis in the period 1994-97,
Corsetti, Pesenti. and Roubini (1998a) find that the results from using that ratio as a
proxy for liquidity are similar to those from using the ratio of MI or M2 to reserves.
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Figure 6. Ratio of Short-Term Debt to Reserves for Selected Countries, 1996"
Ratio
(1.2). this group includes several other countries that faced severe
finaneial difficulties in 1997, including South Africa {11.6), Pakistan
(5.1), Russia (2.3), Bulgaria (2.1). and Zimbabwe (1.3). The only
countries that had ratios of short-term debt to reserves above 1 at the
end of 1996 and fared reasonably well in the following year and a half
were Argentina (1.4), Mexico (1.4), and Singapore (2.3). On this evi-
dence alone, one might be left with the strong suspicion that short-term
debt larger than can be covered by reserves may be sufficient for an
economic crisis. But clearly it is not a necessary condition, as evidenced
by Malaysia, where prudent policies toward short-term debt did not
prevent the spread of the crisis.
Why should the ratio of short-term debt to reserves matter so much?
It is not a very good measure of solvency, which depends on the level
of external debt and expected future earnings from trade. It is also hard
to link it directly to the health of the economy.''^ Rather, it seems to
77. Singapore illustrates that a high ratio of short-term debt to reserves need not
make a country very vulnerable. Note that borrowing decisions are made by firms,
reserves decisions by the government; and the typical guidelines for govemments in (he
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matter for four reasons. First, the ratio of short-term debt to reserves
does measure liquidity, and thus a country's vulnerability to a Diamond-
Dybvig type of bank run.^" Second, a high ratio of .short-term debt to
reserves may signal imprudent macroeconotnic or regulatory policies.
Although not the most direct measure, the higher the ratio of short-term
debt to reserves, the more likely it is that the country is pursuing other
problematic policies. This is especially true because it is highly risky
to use short-term money to finance long-term investments, and risk-
taking investors who engage in such activities may be engaging in other
high risk activities. Third, the ratio of short-term debt to reserves is an
indicator of the vulnerability of a country to a self-fulfilling with-
drawal—or flight—of capital. Finally, it could serve as a "sunspof
that coordinates investors on the bad equilibrium of balance of payments
crisis.
While there may be no necessary connection between the ratio of
short-term foreign liabilities to reserves and the likelihood of a crisis,
it is clear that if a crisis does occur, it will be far more severe if a
country does not have reserves to meet these short-term obligations.
The Motivation for Limiting Short-Term Exposure
The fact that greater short-term exposure seems to increase the prob-
ability of a crisis, whether for rational or irrational reasons, combined
with the systemic consequences of crises—which affect access to credit
and its price for all firms in the economy, as well as the probability of
a bailout—means that short-term borrowing imposes an externality on
the economy. The private decisions of firms regarding the costs and
benefits of greater short-term exposure need not result in the optimal
short-term exposure for the economy as a whole. Policymakers must
therefore assess the desirability of the current level of shon-term debt
and the policies that can be used to address it.
Two considerations are important in weighing the costs and benefits
of short-term capital flows. First, the benefits will depend on the mar-
ginal productivity of the extra investment being financed by the short-
term capital. In the case of East Asia, where the saving rate was very
past have tocused more on "months of imports" than on the short-term foreign indebt-
edness of corporations.
78. Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
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high, the benefits to the extra capital accumulation that followed lib-
eralization may have been relatively low, possibly even negative. This
is not just the result of diminishing returns to capital, but also because
of the costs and imperfections involved in selecting, installing, and
monitoring new investment. Normally, private borrowers and lenders
shouldbeabietoassessthesefactors,but it is possible that "hog cycle"
effects would lead to myopic, or even rational, overinvestment.
Second, if one believes that countries should keep short-term debt
below the level of reserves, additional short-term borrowing must be
offset by equal or larger increases in reserves. From a consolidated
balance sheet perspective, a developing country is borrowing from in-
dustrial countries" banks at high interest rates only to lend that same
money to industrial countries' governments at much lower interest
rates. Being a financial intermediary with a negative spread is probably
not the most profitable line of business!
This may be yet another reason why, as noted above, systematic
empirical studies have not found any relationship between capital ac-
count liberalization and economic growth.
Policies to Restrain Capital Flows
Two remedies that have often been discussed for the problems posed
by the volatility of capital fiows, especially short-term fiows, are to
improve information and to improve financial regulation. We have dis-
cussed some of the potentials and limits of increasing financial regula-
tion above, and in the next section we do likewise for information. We
argue that such measures may be able to accomplish something, but
will not be sufficient. Observation of the East Asian experience suggests
two additional general policies toward capital flows.
First, much of the rapid capital inflow into East Asia, especially in
the form of short-term debt, was the result of domestic distortions that
artificially lowered the price of short-term borrowing from abroad,
through either tax incentives or more lax regulations. The most flagrant
example is the Bangkok International Banking Facility, but more subtle
examples exist almost everywhere: without risk-based capital require-
ments for banks, for instance, incentives for holding certain assets and
liabilities are distorted.
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Second, the improvement of financial regulation and information
may not go far enough, given that corporate exposure may itself give
rise to vulnerabilities. And in Indonesia in end-December 1996, two-
thirds ofthe foreign indebtedness was corporate. The systemic risks of
such exposure are ample justification for taking further measures.
Among the ideas currently under discussion are inhibitions on capital
inflows. In this regard, the Chilean experience offers some useful les-
sons. Chile has imposed a reserve requirement on all short-term capital
inflows—essentially, a tax on short-maturity loans. The overall efficacy
of these controls is much debated, but even most crities acknowledge
that the reserve requirement has significantly lengthened the maturity
composition of capital inflows to Chile, without adverse effects on
valuable long-term capital.^''
Another idea is to use tax policies. For example, one might limit the
extent of tax deductibility for interest in debt denominated in or linked
to foreign eurreneies. The problems of implementing such policies may
in fact be less than those associated with the Chilean system.
In evaluating these proposals, one must be clear about their objec-
tives. Two seem uncontroversial: to reduce, if not to eliminate, the
volatility of flows and the discrepancy between private and social re-
turns. One must also balance their imperfections, the distortions that
they create or the fact that they are partially evaded, against the huge
costs that the market imperfections and the discrepancy between social
and private risk-taking impose on the economy. The key determinants
in assessing that balance are the nature of the market—its ability to
absorb and share risks, the extent ofthe automatic stabilizers and other
structural features that dampen shocks arising from capital market vol-
atility; the nature of the government—its ability to conduct macroeco-
nomic and exchange rate policy and to implement financial market
regulations so that the country is less likely to be subject to capital
market volatility and vulnerable to sudden changes in investor senti-
ment, and the safety nets it provides; and the responses to crises. In
79, Although Chile has reduced the restrictions on capital inflows over the past year,
Ihis does not mean thar they did not work. The point of the restrictions Is to prevent the
overaccumulation of shon-term debt during a surge in inflows, and so they are less
relevant in a period of capital outflows.
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East Asia, not only did the economies appear highly vulnerable, but
safety nets were weak, and responses brought huge economic costs. It
is likely that the risks imposed by capital market volatility may be
comparably high in many other developing countries.
TVansparency
In this section we consider a potential explanatory variable for the
East Asian crisis that has received enormous attention in popular dis-
cussion; corruption, or more broadly, laek of transparency. The study
of the consequences ot corruption has burgeoned in recent years, leav-
ing little doubt that corruption is bad for economic performance.""
Inadequate transparency and corruption, however, have received scant
attention in the literature on currency or banking crises/' We attempt
both to assess the experience of East Asia and to sketch some general
theoretical considerations about the relationship between transparency
and financial stability.
The Political Economy of Transparency
Whenever a crisis strikes, the authorities ofthe affected country look
around for suspects to blame and usually pick on foreign speculators,
even though the charges are typically unsubstantiated. The popular
discussion of transparency is the flip side of this argument: foreign
investors have attempted to shift the blame for their poor investments
onto the countries in which they chose to invest. Looking for a scape-
goat for their shortsightedness, these investors claim that these coun-
tries effectively lied to them, by not disclosing all the relevant infor-
mation. They were not transparent. The governments of the investor
countries and international financial institutions have supported this
claim—perhaps it serves their purposes as well, by providing an expla-
nation of the early failure of the interventions. In doing so, they have
80. See Mauro (1995): Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (1998); World Batik
(1997).
81. About the closesi it get.s is Demirgiii;-Kunt and Detragiache {1998a). who include
a variable on the rule ol" law in predicting banking crises. The East Asian countries score
relatively welt on this measure.
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helped to advertise the alleged weaknesses in their economies and their
societies, further contributing to the downturn.**-'
Moreover, if laek of transparency is the cause of the crisis, the East
Asian countries have only themselves to blame. The international fi-
nancial markets, and thus the financial and capital market liberalization
that some governments and international financiai institutions had been
so active in promoting, were not responsible.
Beyond shifting the blame, transparency has been attractive as an
explanation of the crisis for another reason. To the extent that trans-
parency is a major cause of crises, the international architecture can be
preserved with minimal repairs—an important consideration in an era
of financial stringency, when national legislatures are loath to provide
money for international assistance. All that it requires is that countries
wishing to participate in the international capital market become more
transparent. There is no need for any change in ideology concerning
the virtues of short-term capital flows, nor for large expenditures such
as might be associated with establishing a lender of last resort.
Beyond Journalism and Political Rhetoric
In assessing the substantive role of transparency in causing or per-
petuating the East Asian crisis, several empirical and theoretical issues
arise. We have noted above that these countries had grown faster and
with fewer downtums—demonstrating less vulnerability to shocks—than
those in other regions. Therefore in order to suggest that lack of transpar-
ency was an important factor contributing to their vulnerability, one would
need to argue that they had become less transparent; or alternatively,
that the need for transparency had increased; or that the market was
scared not so much by changes in either the level or the need for
transparency, as by the news of the alleged lack of transparency.
More generally, one must subject transparency to the same scrutiny
as other variables that allegedly explain crises. One must ask whether
there is a systematic relationship between lack of transparency and the
likelihood of a crisis; and whether there is a theoretical presumption
82. See Radeiet and Sachs (i998b). To the extent that the investors had flat priors,
such allegations could have a large effect on their posterior judgment of ihe desirability
of leaving funds in the country: to the extent that the flat priors were due to lack of
transparency (see below), and those making the allegations had credibility, the assertion
Ihat transparency was at the root of their problems was self-fulfilling.
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that better information reduces economic volatility. We look first at
transparency within East Asia, and then turn to the broader question of
the role of transparency in economic stability.
Lack of Transparency on the Relevant Variables
There is no news concerning transparency that could by itself have
instigated the East Asian crisis. As in the case of Mexico in 1994-95.
the extent of transparency—both the information regime and the polit-
ical cronyism—was widely known.
More fundamentally, what information was lacking that would have
prevented the crisis? Implicit in the suggestion that transparency caused
the crisis is that if Investors had only known the relevant infomiation.
they would not have put money into the country, and thus would not
have pulled it out. But the knowledge that there was eventually going
to be a crisis wouid not have stopped investors from putting their money
in. It is true, however, that if tbey knew that there was going to be a
crisis next week, they would pull their money out before that time—
forcing the crisis slightly eariier.
But to the extent that crises are related to fundamentals and infor-
mation about fundamentals might have affected capita! flows, it is nat-
ural to ask whether there was a lack of relevant information. In the
previous section we identified several variables that appear to be system-
atically related to crises; there is no evidence that there was any significant
misreporting on these. Several of the affected countries have statistical
services that are far better than the average within the developing world,
and data on most of the variabies were publicly accessible.*'
East Asia
As we have suggested, there is little evidence that news either about
the degree of transparency or about fundamental variables that are re-
lated to crises played an important role in the case of East Asia. News
about the degree of transparency might have been imponant if there
had been a sudden change. It is very difficult to find definitive evidence
on whether the East Asian countries had become less transparent over
83. In the case of Thailand, the extent to which reserves had been sold forward was
not known. But as has been widely noted in ihe press as well as in the professional
literattire, the information probletns posed by derivatives are hardly unique to East Asia.
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time. There are several measures available that capture different aspects
of corruption and transparency, but few offer time series going back
more than a few years. For the most part, these measure perceptions of
local businessmen, foreign investors, or international risk assessors.
Intertempora! comparisons are problematic, because the standard for
assessing transparency varies over time and the perception of corruption
is often endogenous to circumstances.
The longest time series on corruption is found in the International
Cowrt/rv^/5*GM/(/^'s political risk index.""The "corruption risk" com-
ponent is measured from 1982 on a scale of 0 to 6. where 0 indicates
the greatest risk of corruption. Figure 7 shows these data for Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. The assessment of the risk posed by
corruption was lowered in the 1990s for Indonesia and Korea, but rose
after the onset of the crisis in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. It is
plausible that the assessment of corruption reflected economic perfor-
mance. Other measures of corruption also indicate that the assessment
of corruption in East Asia increased after the crisis, although not nec-
84. Political Risk Services (various years).
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essarily its actual extent."^ Overall, however, there is little basis for
claiming that corruption increased markedly in the run-up to the crisis.
A case can be made that as the world changed around East Asia—
most important, through the Integration of world capital markets—the
demand for transparency grew. Yet the notion that international inves-
tors had higher standards of information disclosure and accuracy about
forward reserve commitments (in the case of Thailand) or short-term
debt (in the case of Korea) is belied by the large increase of capital
flows to East Asia and their declining risk premiums. If transparency
was unchanged in East Asia but was becoming more important in the
world, one would expect this to have been reflected In higher risk
premiums than those observed shortly before the crisis.*"'
Comparing East Asian Countries with Others
If transparency is a major cause of crisis, countries with low trans-
parency should have a higher probability of crises and countries with
high transparency should have a lower probability. Previous studies
have not employed transparency as an explanatory variable of crisis
because it has little predictive power, despite its journalistic attraction
in the case of East Asia."^
This can be seen most simply by asking whether the Bast Asian
countries were significantly less transparent than countries that did not
have crises. If less developed countries in generai lack transparency,
lack of transparency can hardly explain why a crisis occurred in East
Asia. If East Asian countries are less transparent than other globally
integrated countries that did not experience a crisis, it may be that lack
of transparency becomes more important as countries become inte-
85. This is not surprising, given the emphasis laid on corruption by those involved
in the rescue operalion. both international and domestic Note, however, that a strong
domestic resonance to the concerns about corruption, for example, in Indonesia, does
not necessarily indicate that corruption had increased substantially, but only Ihal those
within the country who had long been concerned about corruption realized this as an
opportunity to address the issue.
86. To be sure, a number of other factors also affect the attractiveness of investment,
but there are several reasons why investments in these countries should have been viewed
as riskier than elsewhere; for example, the high leverage in South Korea, the speculative
real estate boom m much of Southeast Asia, and the exchange rate regimes. Thus the
low premiums observed before the crisis represent a low upper bound in market assess-
ments of the importance of transparency.
87. Radelet and Sachs (1998a).
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Tible 6. Measures of lYansparency in East Asian Countries Relative to






































Sourie: Political Risk Services (various years); Siantlaril & Poors DRI (variow year*); International InMiluie Tor Man-
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c. Corruption nsfc. 1996; sample includes ninety-nine countries.
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e. Ciirruplion pefceplions Jndei;. 1996: sample includes iwenty-four coiimries.
f. Exisience of imprupcr practice* in Ihc public sphere. ITOft; sample incltides iwuntj counlries.
grated. However, intemational comparisons are complicated by the
same factors as are intertemporal comparisons. In Indonesia, for in-
stance, perceptions prior to 1997 may have understated corruption be-
cause economic growth was so strong.
Subject to this caveat, table 6 shows how the East Asian countries
ranked in 1996 against other developing countries on various measures
of transparency, measured by a percentile scale on which 0 indicates
the most transparent."" The International Country Risk Guide and the
Standard & Poors DRI ratings use large samples; Indonesia, the Phil-
lipines, and Thailand fall roughly in the middle. But in the smaller
samples assessed by Transparency International and the World Com-
petitiveness Yearbook, Indonesia is rated among the most corrupt, and
Thailand and the Philippines aiso fare worse. The smaller group com-
parisons are probably the more relevant, because they assess corruption
among countries attracting high levels of foreign investment. In all of
the measures, however. Korea and Malaysia stand out as very trans-
parent. Note that these measures emphasize corruption, rather than
88. Political Risk Services (various years); Standard & Poors DRI (various years):
International Institute for Management Development (1996); and data from the world-
wide web page of Transparency International, Berlin.
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transparency more broadly defined. The difficulty of reading the balance
sheet of the typical Korean chaebol, for instance, while relevant to the
financial crisis, is not reflected in this table.
This comparison between the East Asian countries and others casts
doubt on the notion that transparency is sufficient to cause a financial
crisis. Indeed, given that the last major financial-cum-currency crises
occurred about ten years ago in the Scandinavian countries, which were
paragons of transparency, it is not clear that lack of transparency is
necessary for a financial crisis.""
Some Theoretical Observations on Transparency and
Economic Fluctuations
Our analysis has established that there is, at best, a weak empirical
link between crises, or vulnerability, and lack of transparency. From a
theoretical perspective, the impact of improved information on eco-
nomic stability has been examined extensively in the literature on the
economics of information, which has burgeoned over the past quarter
century. It is important to separate the role that transparency plays in
causing crises from the role it plays in propagating crises from its more
general role in "normal" times in enhancing overall efficiency. Better
information should be expected to improve the allocation of resources,
but our question is different: does it lead to greater stability, less price
or output variability, less likelihood of a crisis, or less credit rationing?
In generai, lack of transparency should not affect the mean of peo-
ple's expectations. Suppose that a set of countries did not publish their
monthly reserves numbers or were known to use accounting tricks to
inflate these numbers. It is unlikely that, on average, investors" esti-
mates would be much higher than actual reserves. The lack of trans-
parency, however, has a large effect on the variance of people's expec-
tations. It also flattens out their priors. As a result, any information that
they do receive has a much larger effect on their beliefs."^'
89. Or perhaps more accurately, even in the most transparent of economies, there
are imperfections in information that, in retmspeoi. might have been valuable in pre-
venting a crisis. More fundamentally. Hahii (1966) and Shell and Stiglitz (1967) show
that bubbles can occur in the absence of markets that extend infinitely into the future,
even when information about current variables is perfect.
90. Calvo and Mendoza (1998) have a conceptually simitar explanation for why
increased giobaiization could lead to greater contagion, as investors' information about
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Lack of transparency did not cause the East Asian crisis, but it may
well have contributed to its perpetuation and made recovery more dif-
ficult. The large asset price changes associated with an economic down-
turn increase the riskiness of lending. The less transparent the account-
ing systems, the less able are lenders and other suppliers of capital to
ascertain the financial position of potential borrowers. Thus credit ra-
tioning may become more widespread, or credit may become available
only with a much higher risk premium, further undermining the finan-
cial positions of firms. But although lack of transparency seems to have
contributed to the depth of the economic downturn in the East Asian
crisis in this way, there is no general theory that says that greater
transparency leads to more lending or le.ss credit rationing, or even to
iess price volatility. Accordingly, one should be wary of putting im-
proved transparency at the center of a reform strategy for a new inter-
national financial architecture.
Transparency and Credit Rationing
Credit rationing takes place when lenders are unwilling to lend to
certain borrowers, even though they are identical to others who are
getting loans and they would be willing to pay higher interest rates. It
can occur whenever the expected return to the loan decreases with
higher interest rates. Under these circumstances, if the demand for loans
at the expected-return-maximizing interest rate is greater than the sup-
ply, there will be credit rationing. The equilibrium in the market will
have demand greater than supply, but the interest rate will not rise to
clear the market, because that would lower the expected return to lend-
ers. In this subsection we discuss how transparency, or lack thereof,
can affect the presence and degree of credit rationing.
The impact of lack of information on the expected returns of a lender,
and therefore on the lender's desire to make a loan, depends on how
any given country becomes poorer. There may even be an argument that with more
possibilities for diversification, the optimal amount of intormation about any particular
investment opportunity becomes less. To our knowledge, no one has developed a theo-
retical model to explore these issues. However, the hypothesis of nonconvexity in the
value of information (Radner and Stiglitz. 1984) suggests a strategy in which investors
become well informed about a relatively few securities among which they choose to
allocate significant fractions of their portfolios; they diversify the rest of their portfolios
widely and obtain relatively little information about these other securities. There is
casual empirical evidence that many fund managers behave in this way.
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quickly returns increase (or decrease) in the variable about which there
is uncertainty—or to be precise, whether the function is concave or
convex. Assume, for instance, that there is imperfect information about
the size of a firm's indebtedness. Consider a marginal lender making
the decision to lend to the firm at the market interest rate r. The firm
has total unknown debt of B and invests in a project with a return of/?.
If the debt is sufficiently low that all lenders can be repaid they get r\
otherwise the firm is liquidated and its returns are divided among the
debt holders. The returns to the marginal lender are p = min {r, R/B}.
This function is neither convex nor concave in B. As a result, there is
no general presumption that less transparency, which we model as
greater uncertainty about fi—strictly a mean-preserving spread—will
increase the presence or extent of credit rationing. Whether less trans-
parency increases or decreases the expected return depends on the
distribution."'
It is often said that once the crisis had begun. lenders suddenly
learned that they had less information than they thought they had. One
could model this as the variance of their beliefs after the crisis being
greater than the variance of their beliefs before it. To see what this
would have done to credit rationing, consider a situation where there is
imperfect information about the activity undertaken by the borrower.
The borrower has two activities: one yields a return of R^ with proba-
bility IT,, and Rf, otherwise; the other yields a return of W, with proba-
bility IT;, and /?„ otherwise. /?„, the bad realization, is less than /?, and
/?j. The second project is assumed to be safer—TT, > TT,—and more
efficient—TT, (/?, - /?„) > IT, (/?, - /?„)—but it has less upside
potential—/fj < /?,. In addition, the entrepreneur has initial debt B,
91. Note ihat when lenders are constrained in raising the interest rate, either because
of adverse selection or incentive effects, the increase in expected retums may result in
some categories of borrower gaining access to credit that previously did not; that is,
credit rationing is reduced (see Sliglitz and Weiss, 1981). In markets that are not so
constrained, by contrast, the increase in expected returns will be reflected in a lower
lending rate. Thus for the average borrower, increased transparency is not desirable.
BUI the best firms would find it advantageous to have their low Indebtedness known.
Therefore while there are market forces at play leading to increased transparency, the
market by itself may not arrive at a socially efficient level of transparency. This is
another example of a market failure that naive theories of financial and capital market
liberalization have not adequately taken into account. See Stiglitz (1975a, 1975b).
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and for simplicity it is assumed that rB > R^, so that the firm will be
unable to pay its debts in the bad realization.
The firm chooses the technique i = 1 or 2 that maximizes -n^R, -
rB); that is, it chooses the safe projects if r < r*, where r* is given by
^^ ^ T T ^ ; - TT,/g,
This defines the cutoff interest rate as a function of B\ r* = r*{B).
The expected return to the lender at r depends on the initial debt for
two reasons. First, for any given interest rate r, borrowers with debt
above a certain threshold, defined by the inverse of the equation above,
will undertake the more ri.sky project. Second, for any given choice of
project, the level of the debt affects the rate of return to the bad reali-
zation, which is insufficient to cover the debt and interest. Hence, if
the bank chooses to charge interest rate r, all those with indebtedness
B < B—where B = r'-'(/=)—choose the safe project. That is.
As figure 8 shows, this function is locally convex within the region fi
> fi and S < fi, where these are separated by the difference in the
expected return to the lender (evaluated at B) between the borrower
choosing the safe and the risky projects:
T, R, ~
Overall, however, it is neither convex nor concave.
Thus a mean-preserving increase in uncertainty about B (that is, less
transparency) may increase or decrease the expected return, £p.
If the mean return is increased enough for a particular group of
borrowers, then although they may previously have been credit ra-
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tioned, they may no longer be." In a collapse such as in Bast Asia, the
relevant case is probably that in which the mean-preserving spread
increases the probability of very high debt but not the probability of
very low debt; that is. it may plausibly have taken place entirely in the
region B > B. Yet at the same time, investors revised up their expec-
tations for the mean value of fi, leading to more credit rationing.
In short, increased transparency—about critical variables such as the
level of indebtedness, for example—does not necessarily result in less
credit rationing, or even in lower interest rates, for the typical firm."
Transparency and Market Volatility
At issue in the concept of transparency, or improved information, is
not only the amount of information, but also its timing. For instance,
information may become available continuously or in a "lumpy" man-
ner, through occasional disclosures of large amounts of information.
The effect of many attempts at secrecy is to make information flows
more lumpy. There is a strong presumption that lumpy information
results in lumpy asset value revaluations—that is. large discrete
changes in asset prices—which contribute to overall economic volatil-
92. These results are not affected by the fact that the market Interest rate on safe
securities may be increased at the same time. For a group of firms that is not rationed
out of the market, the interest rale is the solution to the equation
£p = r^,
where r^ is the retum on the safe asset. This equation defines r, and
drldr„ = 1 / (dEplBr) > 0.
since if there is no credit rationing. i)E(i/dr > 0. Now let ^ connote a change in trans-
parency, that is, a mean-preserving spread. For a credit-rationed firm, r is chosen to
max, £p = p*.
Tben
dp* I di = {dp*ldr)(dr/a^} + (hp*/di).
Since dp*/3r = 0. from the above maximization, the change in the optimal retum wilh
a change in transparency is dp*/d^. the properties of which we have just analyzed in the
text.
93. The analysis above assumes risk-neutral lenders. Presumably, if lenders are
sufficiently risk averse, increased transparency should have more positive effects; but
in well-functioning eapital markets, it is hard to see why lenders would be very risk
averse. Note, though, that the literature on imperfect information explains why there
are in fact a variety of imperiections in capital markets.
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ity, just as a lumpy change in exchange rates (under fixed rate systems)
may place more stress on the economy than does a continuous adjust-
ment.
But consider an alternative model of lack of transparency. Assume
that a firm distributes its crop yield at the end of every year. This yield
is a function of the weather in the previous spring and fall, Y, = f{Z\
Z{). Assume that the weather within any given year may be correlated.
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but weather is uncorrelated across years (Z; is distributed independent
of Zl for any t^ u). Assume also that people cannot observe the weather
directly.
Shares of this crop are traded at the end of spring and fall. First
consider a nontransparent information revelation process, which only
reveals the state of the weather at the end of each year. In this case,
share prices at the end of fall are V*, and at the end of spring,
V = £LAZ;,zo] + (3v*,
where p is the discount factor over a half-year. In this case, there is no
volatility, other than the predictable movement of share prices based
on the proximity of a dividend payment.
Now consider the case when information about the weather is re-
vealed at the end of each season. At the end of fall share prices will
still be V*, but at the end of spring, prices will be given by the stochastic
V = E\J{Z].Zr)\Z]\ + pV*.
It is clear that there is more volatility in the price with greater infor-
mation, or more transparency.
Indeed, from the perspective of statistical decisionmaking with risk
neutrality, in a rational expectations model where price equals the ex-
pected value of the relevant variable (for example, profits), more in-
formation must constitute a mean-preserving spread. Two states of
nature that were previously confounded are now separated as a result
of the information refinement. The value of the information may well
not be equal to the cost of the information improvement, even in a
partial equilibrium model; indeed, the central point of the Radner-
Stiglitz theorem is that under quite general conditions, small refine-
ments are never worth their cost.**^  With imperfect risk markets, it is
easy to construct general equilibrium models in which more infor-
mation—and hence greater price volatility—leads to lower economic
welfare.
Increased transparency may increase price volatility for another rea-
son. It may result in expectations being more similar. With diverse
expectations, while some individuals perceive the returns to an asset as
decreasing, others may not and may even see it as increasing. Thus the
94, Radner and Stiglitz (1984).
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latter are willing to buy the asset as the former are willing to sell it.
But if everyone has the same beliefs, any signal will be interpreted by
everyone in the same way; prices must fully adjust to reflect that signal,
and in fact little trade may oecur.
Transparency in Perspective
In developing countries, the absence and thinness of markets exac-
erbates the information problem; fewer securities are subject to the
"price discovery" function of markets, and the accuracy with which
those functions are performed is less. Several institutional features of
the East Asian economies contributed further to the transparency prob-
lem. For instance, because banks in some countries were allowed to
invest in securities, their net worth was more volatile. Cross-guarantees
may have made it difficult to sort out how one firm was affected by the
default of another. The greater risk associated with developing countries
implies that even absent these special institutional features, information
problems such as those associated with changes in asset values would
still be greater.
But although the problem of transparency has been especially iden-
tified with developing countries since the East Asian crisis, more de-
veloped countries have not gone as far toward disclosure as they could
have. We noted above that in the United States and elsewhere bank
regulators have resisted pressures from economists for mark-to-market
accounting, and have also been slow to use more comprehensive and
economically relevant measures—including market value risk, as well
as credit risk—in setting risk adequacy standards.
Transparency is also problematic for certain public institutions. Even
in more advanced economies, central banks have long had a policy of
limiting transparency. Only recently have a few disclosed information
concerning their deliberations, and then only with a lag. Evidently,
both in regulation and in the control of monetary policy, central banks
believe that too much transparency may circumscribe their discretionary
ability; for example, to keep alive a bank whose net worth is negative
on a mark-to-market basis, even though its future prospects may be
good. Indeed, one could argue that greater transparency would have
greatly aggravated the banking crisis in the United States in the 1980s,
because many major banks would have had to shut down, greatly curtail
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their lending, or receive substantial injections of equity. By the same
token, the discretion that comes from less transparency can be abused.
More generally, if discretion is desirable, surely it should be provided
transparently.
Many of the calls for greater transparency concern information about
aggregate quantities, such as short-term indebtedness, which u'ould not
be required in the perfectly competitive model, where all the relevant
information is conveyed by prices. One frequently lauded virtue of the
decentralized market is that information can be completely decentral-
ized. The fact ofthe matter is that there are market imperfections, many
related to imperfect information. And once one admits not only that
these market imperfections exist, but that they are sufficiently important
to require government action in mandating disclosure, one must con-
template other forms of intervention as well."
Moreover, once one recognizes the importance of information im-
perfections, the entire issue of financial and capital market liberalization
takes on a different perspective.^ *" By removing restrictions on lending
practices, financial market liberalization has undoubtedly exacerbated
the problem of transparency. A central tenet of much of the liberaliza-
tion movement, that regulators should intervene only through the rig-
orous enforcement of capital adequacy standards, has no theoretical
basis. Regulatory regimes that employ other instruments can be shown
to be Pareto superior to those that rely exclusively on capital adequacy
standards, even if these are rigorously enforced.''
Summary
On theoretical grounds. the effects of increased transparency on price
volatility or the volatility of the economy are ambiguous. As an ex-
95. There is no general iheorem ihat says that in the presence of imperfect infor-
mation, the only government intervention required to attain Pareto-efticient outcomes
are disclosure requirements; see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986). Note that some (for
example, Grossman. 1976) have tried to argue that the market provides efficient incen-
tives for information disclosure, but it can be shown that this is not true in general
(Stiglitz. 1975a. 1975b).
96. See Stiglitz (1994).
97. See Hellman. Murdock. and Stiglitz (1997). Tbeir analysis assumes that true
capital can be monitored without cost but reported capital provides a biased estimate
due to accounting practices. There bas been .some concem that rigorous enforcement of
Ihe Basle .standards may not only increase tbe true Ievei of risk-taking but also lower
the quality of information.
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planatory variable in predicting the crisis, transparency does not seem
to be useful. This observation is refiected in the fact that although
statements such as "corruption causes tinancial crises" are the conven-
tional wisdom in some circles, very little ofthe literature on currency
or financial crises has placed much emphasis, either theoretical or em-
pirical, on the various notions of transparency. The link is asserted
based mostly on a singie data point, rather than on systematic evidence.
At least in the case of Indonesia, there is a plausible case that the
exact opposite was true: the crisis may have been due to the expectation
that corruption was going to be reduced. A substantial fraction of the
profits and value of many companies, including the franchise value of
banks and other financial institutions, may have been based on their
political connections to the Suharto regime and the favors that followed
from them. The worrisome news in the fall of 1997 was not that this
corruption and nepotism existed. Rather, it was that these connections
or favors might dry up, either because of the increased transparency
promised by the reforms or because of the increased likelihood that
Suharto's regime would end because o( his poor health or political
vulnerability.^ *" The costs of this openness for many investors—rather
than corrupt practices by the government—may have played a role in
the large outflow of capital that was the central feature of the crisis.
Regardless of one's interpretation of the role of corruption in the
causation of crises, our analysis has two important policy implications.
The first is that countries would do well to improve transparency, even
if this does not inoculate them against a crisis. In the East Asian epi-
sode, the adverse effects ofa lack of transparency are clear: the market
observed that some firms were weak, but it could not easily identify
those that were. Because of the lack of transparency, the market shut
off the supply of capital to all lirms. or charged all of them a high risk
premium, thus exacerbating the downtum.*•
98. Some evidence for this view comes from Fisman (1998), who. based on an event
study of the reaction of stock prices Io news about Suhano's health, concludes ihat
political connections to Suharto were responsible for at least 25 percent of the stock
market value of the most "politically dependent" companies listed on the Jakarta stock
exchange.
99. This would be tbe outcome if, for Instance, the amount lent is a convex function
of "expected" net worth. Then a more refined partition of the information set—that
distinguished the different positions of tirms more precisely—would lead to more lend-
ing overall.
72 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1998
The second policy implication has to do with the desirability of
capital market liberalization in the short or medium term. We have
observed that those East Asian countries that experienced a crisis, while
differing widely in the degree of transparency, were roughly average.
There are good reasons to believe that changing the information or
political regimes of a developing country will take a long time. There-
fore if transparency is necessary for countries that wish to be globally
integrated, since without transparency they face the kinds of risks ex-
perienced in East Asia, it is clear that they should take a carefully paced
approach to global financial market integration. It is ironic that some
of the strongest advocates of rapid integration have argued most vehe-
mently for transparency as an explanation of the crisis. But this is
perhaps related more to the political economy considerations discussed
above than to our empirical evidence or theoretical analyses.
Responding to Crises: The Role of Interest Rates
Whereas the causes of currency and banking crises have been the
subject of much theoretical and empirical modeling in recent years, the
question of how countries should respond to financial crises has re-
ceived much less attention. There has been no shortage of opinions
about the policy packages adopted in East Asia, but in general they do
not rest on a well-supported body of theory or evidence. This is espe-
cially true for a central issue in the first months of the crisis: the role
of high interest rates policies in stabilizing exchange rates.
The relationship between interest rates and exchange rates in a crisis
is crucial. Large exchange rate depreciations can be very damaging.
According to the IMF, 71 percent of "currency crashes" between 1975
and 1997 have resulted in output losses relative to trend.'"" Long-lasting
increases in real interest rates are also extremely costly, not just for the
traditional macroeconomic reasons, but also because of their effect on
the health of the banking system. There remain several open questions
about the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates: Are
there circumstances in which higher interest rates will weaken the econ-
omy and lead to currency depreciation? If so, the high-interest-rate
IOO. International Monetary Fund {1998).
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policy is strictly dominated by the low-interest-rate poiicy. If not, is
the trade-off between a stronger exchange rate and permanently higher
interest rates, or temporarily higher rates? And if the interest rate hike
need only be temporary, what determines the magnitude ofthe increase
and its duration?
In this section we first assess the circumstances under which raising
interest rates today will in fact increase the exchange rate today, as
claimed by advocates of high interest rates. We then address the
stronger and more important claim that temporarily high interest rates
will lead to a permanently stronger exchange rate. We develop several
models under which this could be true and assess whether they are
reasonable descriptions ofthe East Asian economies. We subsequently
turn this claim on its head, showing that when temporarily high interest
rates are brought down to normal levels, the result could be a perma-
nently weaker exchange rate. This could be true even if, while the
interest rates were high, the value of the currency was maintained or
strengthened. Next, wediscusstheconditionsunder which each of these
models is likely to be correct. We also present some empirical evidence
on the circumstances under which temporarily high interest rates are
likely to help or to hurt exchange rates. Finally, we discuss some policy
implications of this analysis, in particular, the proper role of monetary
policy in exchange rate stabilization.
The Immediate Effect of Higher Interest Rates
Policymakers seem generally to assume that increasing today's in-
terest rate will strengthen today's exchange rate. We show, however,
that this belief is only warranted under certain circumstances, using the
"uncovered interest parity" framework. While this framework is in-
complete, in that it does not provide a solution for the expected future
exchange rate, it is very general and can be embedded in virtually any
model of the exchange rate.
With risk neutrality, equilibrium in exchange rate markets must bal-
ance the expected return from holding domestic currency and, say,
dollars. This generates a differential equation for exchange rates that,
together with a boundary value condition, determines the exchange rate
today. To analyze the effect of a change in the domestic interest rate,
one then needs only to analyze the effect on the expected future rate
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and solve the differential equation backward. In uncovered interest
parity, this is written
1 + /, = ^ ( 1 +i:).
where e, is the nominal exchange rate (local currency per unit of foreign
currency), / Is the interest rate, * denotes a foreign variable, and su-
perscript E denotes the expectation.""
An increase in the interest rate makes it more attractive to invest in
the country, and if the expected future exchange rate remains un-
changed, today's exchange rate will appreciate. This raises the first
problem: monetary policy systematically affects the expected future
exchange rate. For instance, if the increase in the interest rate lowers
the price level, or the rate of inflation, by purchasing power parity, one
will expect a stronger exchange rate in the future. In that case, the
change in tbe boundary value reinforces the dynamic effect, and the
exchange rate today strengthens—overshooting its new equilibrium.'"^
Alternatively, if confidence in the country weakens, it will be viewed
as a less attractive place for investment. At the same time, a restriction
of credit could, for a given exchange rate, reduce the supply of exports.
Thus the future (and possibly even current) demand for currency falls,
and the expected future exchange rate weakens. The dynamic and
boundary value effects go in opposite directions, and the movement in
the current exchange rate will be ambiguous.
A second problem is that it is not the promised nominal interest rate
that matters but the expected return, which must take into account the
probability of default, itself an endogenous variable. An increase in the
nominal interest rate could lead to a decrease in the expected interest
rate, in which case the dynamic effect on today's exchange rate is
negative. Although it may be reasonable to neglect this point in exam-
ining, say, the relationship between the U.S. dollar and the German
mark, it is not at all valid to do so in potential or actual economic crises,
101. In principle, what is relevant is lim eU] at f-» x, where e is Ihe exchange rate.
Our analysis focuses on a shorter run "boundary value." a time at which ihe exchange
rate has returned lo its eijuillbrium value (say. ten years). Uncovered interest parity is
usually interpreted over periods of three months to a year. Arguably, the horizons of
investors are even shorter—possibly, even measured in minutes—which may explain
why bubbles seem lo emerge so frequently.
102. See Dombusch (1976).
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when concern about repayment is usually the central cause of loans not
being rolled over and of capital outflow.
A third problem is that the market may be risk averse. Moreover,
both willingness to bear risk and perceptions of risk might change
dramatically and could be adversely affected by policies that might be
seen as inducing a recession, such as an increase in interest rates.'"'
One can combine the second and third effects in a revised uncovered
interest parity equation:
- V =
where 8 is the probability of bankruptcy and v is the risk premium.
Since these are both increasing functions of /,, increases in /, have an
ambiguous effect on the left-hand side of the equation, and thus an
ambiguous effect on the exchange rate.
In a realistic model, 5 and v would probably also be increasing
functions of depreciation, at least, for very large depreciations in econ-
omies with unhedged foreign debt. In our analysis, however, we take
as given the initial shock—the reduction in demand for Thailand's
currency, for example—and ask what the policy response should be.
We also take the initial depreciation as given. Thus for our purposes,
in these functions depreciation only affects the outcomes through its
second order effects and would only strengthen the analysis. If higher
interest rates had a sufficiently adverse effect on the economy to lead
to even further depreciation, this, in turn, would feed back into still
higher probabilities of default and a lower exchange rate; and vice versa
if higher interest rates led to a higher exchange rate.
Temporary Interest Rate Increases and
Permanently Stronger Exchange Rates
Under the conventional wisdom, the best-case scenario is that higher
interest rates will not affect the probability of bankruptcy or the degree
of uncertainty. Even in this case, however, the magnitude of the interest
rate increases required to prevent or reverse a large depreciation would
be huge. If there is no change in the expected future exchange rate,
103. Even if the long-run exchange rate strengthened, this effect could undo the
overshooting in the transition path.
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defending a currency against the expectation of a 1 percent fall the
following day would require an overnight interest rate of 1 percent per
day above the international interest rate—that is, an annual rate over
3,678 percent.'""* Furthermore, in the basic model this effect will be
almost completely reversed when interest rates are lowered once again
to their original level.'"''
This is not the policy that most people have in mind. Policymakers
typically claim that a period of temporarily higher interest rates will be
sufficient to strengthen the exchange rate permanently. Indeed, the fact
that higher interest rates are only temporary is publicly announced and
universally believed. And it is sometimes claimed that because these
rates are temporary, they will not be very costly for the economy. This
claim is much stronger than the relationship between today's high in-
terest rates and today's high exchange rates discussed above.
Why should one believe that a temporary increase will lead the
stronger exchange rate to persist even after the interest rates have come
down? One simple reason could be that the shock to the exchange rate
is itself temporary. In this case, the higher interest rates might induce
a flow of funds into the country, maintaining the exchange rate at its
previous level until the temporary disturbance disappears.'"*"The inter-
est rates can then be lowered and the exchange rate will retain its value.
But note that although the exchange rate intervention has in some sense
succeeded, its benefits are only temporary. Had there not been an in-
tervention, the exchange rate would have fallen, but it would have risen
again once the disturbance disappeared. Thus one must compare the
benefit of the higher exchange rate in the interim to the cost of the
higher interest rate in the interim (as discussed further below).
104. To put this in perspective, between July I, 1997 and January 30. 1998. Ihe
Indonesian rupiah declined at a daily rate of 0.8 perceni. some days falling hy as much
as 18 percent. A risk-neutral investor expecting such depreciation would have kept his
money in Indonesia oniy in exchange for a 1.700 perceni annuali/ed return sustained
over seven months. A risk-averse investor would have demanded an even higher interest
rate.
105. Almo.'ii completely because the price level will be permanently lower than il
would have been as a result of Ihe period of lemporarily lower intlation.
106. Note thai if ihe niarkel shares tbese beliefs and it works well, no government
intervention will be required; capital flows will stabilize the exchange rate (unless the
source of the disturbance was a change in international interest rales). Thus intervention
must be based on the premise that markets are not functioning well, including the
possibility that govemment bureaucrats have better judgment thati the market.
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However, most policymakers who advocate temporarily high interest
rates in defense of the exchange rate argue that these can be effective
even in the face of a permanent shock. Assuming standard economic
relationships, including rational expectations, there are three models
under which this could be the case.'"' The first acknowledges that the
effects ofthe interest rates are only temporary, but argues that they can
be used to buy time for other reforms to strengthen the exchange rate.
The second says that a movement aiong a curve—for example, the
demand curve for the country's currency—results in a shift ofthe curve,
that is, a permanently greater level of demand /or any given interest
rate. This is principally explained in terms of "signaling," which
conveys information, such as the degree of commitment to the exchange
rate target. The third model says that there are multiple equilibria, and
that high interest rates may serve to coordinate the economy on one
equilibrium rather than another.
BUYING TIME FOR OTHER REFORMS. One commonly stated rationale
for temporarily higher interest rates is that they will buy time for the
development and implementation of other reforms to strengthen the
exchange rate. Note that if the government does in fact make a credible
commitment to reform, interest rates do not need to rise. Indeed, raising
the interest rate only would make sense if the government, or other
parties participating in the design of the policy package, either do not
believe that package is credible or do not believe that the market will
believe it so. Thus raising interest rates could be viewed as a signal of
lack of confidence. More generally, the more credible the promised
reforms, the less interest rates have to rise today to defend the currency.
This follows from the fact that an announcement about poiicy measures,
if it is believed to raise expectations about the strength of the future
exchange rate, will feed back into today's exchange rate through the
uncovered interest parity relationship.
How reforms affect the expected future exchange rate is probably as
muchamatterof psychology as of economics. There is very little basis,
however, for making confident predictions about the market's reactions
to different reform proposals—and there is little evidence that govern-
107. To be sure, many advocates of these policies implicitly believe thai there are
irrationalities in the market, and that government intervention is supposed lo overcome
them. Frequently, these are the very people who argue against govemment intervention
more generally, believing in the efficiency of market mechanisms.
78 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1998
ment officials engaged in designing reform packages are particularly
good in predicting market psychology. But from the perspective of
economic theory, one is on much firmer ground. Here it is important to
realize that not every "reform" will strengthen the future equilibrium
exchange rate. We focus on a future sufficiently close that the proposed
policies are expected to be still in place.
In an economy which has had prudent fiscal policies, as was the case
with the East Asian economies, a fiscal contraction will lead to a more
depreciated future equilibrium exchange rate. This result holds in the
standard model, essentially because the fiscal contraction raises national
saving: thus the need for funds from abroad is reduced or the supply of
currency is increased. Furthermore, in an economy with aggregate sup-
ply and aggregate demand roughly in balance, as was also the case in
East Asia, a fiscal contraction exacerbates the downturn that almost
always follows a financial or currency crisis, increasing the probability
of bankruptcy and uncertainty about the future. As a result, the attrac-
tiveness of investing in and lending to the country will be reduced,
contributing to the depreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate.
Similarly, structural reforms will not always strengthen the future
equilibrium exchange rate, at least in our short-term horizon—even if
they are beneficial for long-run productivity. If these reforms result in
the disruption ofthe flow of credit, a rise in bankruptcy, and an increase
in uncertainty about the economy, they may lower the expected short-
to intermediate-run return to investing in the economy, and thus the
equilibrium exchanger rate.'""
SIGNALING. The best case for a high interest rate policy is that it leads
to a change in a state variable: beliefs about, for example, the resolve
of the monetary authorities to pursue low infiation, which shifts the
demand curve. Furthermore, beliefs change in such a way that when
the interventions are withdrawn, not only will interest rates fall, but
exchange rates will stabilize at a level higher than they would have
done without the intervention.
There is well-developed theory to explain how government interven-
tions might change beliefs. For instance, if the government or interna-
108. Thus had the United States eliminated the distortionary lax preferences for real
estate in the midst of the S&L crisis—as would have been desirable for long-run pro-
ductivity—the effects on the banking system would have heen disastrous and it is quite
likely that the economy would have plunged into a deep recession.
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tional agencies have information that is not publicly available, agents
in the economy may make inferences about the underlying state of the
economy from the nature ofthe interventions. Strong and painful eco-
nomic actions, especially preemptive actions taken before signs of crisis
are visible, may be interpreted as an indication of serious economic
malady. The actions themselves, given a particular appraisal of the
economy, may lead to greater optimism; but whether the combined
effect of the change in the appraisal and the change in actions is positive
or negative is generally ambiguous. '"^  This is especially the case when
the efficacy of the remedies will be established only in the long run.
while the impact ofthe reappraisals will be felt immediately. Much of
this literature is based on rational expectations; when irrationalities are
taken into account, the possible adverse effects become magnified.
There is little, if any, research that explicitly models or tests the
positive effects of temporary high interest rates as a signal of the resolve
of a centrai bank to maintain or strengthen the value of the currency.''"
This hypothesis can. however, be subjected to theoretical and empirical
tests. At the theoretical level, the key question is one of internal con-
sistency. A basic tenet ofthe theory of signaling is that to be effective,
signals must be costly: if it were costless to signal that one were a
responsible monetary authority by imposing high interest rates, every-
one would do so, and thus high interest rates would not be an effective
109- In tbe context of U.S. monetary policy. Romer and Romer (1996) show that
the information revealed by a monetary' tightening—that an economy is in the bad state
of high expected inflation—more than offsets its direct economic effects, leading com-
mercial forecasters, on average, to revise up their expectations for inflation. This finding
begs the question why the Federal Reserve does not release its contemporaneous fore-
casts, in contrast to the Administration and the Congressional Budget Office, which
make public the forecasts underlying tbeir budgetary policies and proposals.
110. There has, however, been extensive work on ihc importance of signaling in
foreign exchange markets. Agnor (1994) provides a theoretical mode! in which signaling
can help to maintain a good equilibrium, although the signals ihat he describes—"the
removal of capital controls, a drastic cut in the budget deficit, the appointment of a
•conservative" central hanker, etc." {p. II)—do not e.xpiicilly include high interest
rates. Dominguez and Frankel (1993) find that even sterilized interventions can affect
exchange rates, and ascribe the majority of ihis effect to the .signaling cotnponent of the
intervention. Watanabe {1994) finds similar results tor Japan. In all of these analyses,
foreign exchange interventions are important because ihey signal the commitment to a
stronger currency, implicitly opening up the possibility of funher interventions, and
possibly even tighter monetary policy. By contrast, when a country uses high interest
rates to defend its currency, the announced intention and the economy's expectation are
usually that these rates will he lowered over lime.
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signaling mechanism. One cannot hold simultaneously to the beliefs
that there will not be real, adverse consequences (real costs, at least to
some groups within the population) and that high interest rates are an
effective signaling mechanism.
Another aspect of internal consistency that involves political pro-
cesses is that if the cost is too high the signal is not credible, because
no one will believe that the policy will be sustained.'" Even if the
current government establishes its credibility, there is overwhelming
evidence that economic downturns lead to an increased likelihood of a
change in government."- Although in principle an independent mone-
tary authority might insulate monetary policy from such political pres-
sures, at least for a time, even monetary authorities with a long history
of independence recognize their vulnerability: if they push too hard,
their independence can be taken away. Paul Volcker put this well when,
as chairman ofthe Federal Reserve, he told a congressional committee
that "the Congress created us and the Congress can uncreate us.""^
The costs and benefits of signaling depend on institutional structure
and the previous history of the economy. Recall that for signaling to be
effective, costs must be borne by the agent. While high interest rates
may impose huge costs on the economy in general, and on workers in
particular, the more independent the central bank and the less represen-
tative its governing board, the lower will be the cost to the central bank
of any disruption associated with the higher rates. Thus increasing
central bank independence will raise the costs of signaling that are
imposed on the economy. These have so far been ignored by advocates
of greater independence, who, ironically, often seem implicitly to be
relying more heavily on the signaling theory as a justification of high
interest rate poiicies. However, countries where central banks have
pursued good macroeconomic policy are likely to receive less benefit
from signaling their resolve to address macroeconomic problems. The
differences in the costs and benefits faced by countries in different
111. Drazen and Masson provide a nice illustration of this point: "One afternoon a
colleague announces to you that he is serious about losing weight and plans to skip
dinner. He adds that he has noi eaten for two days. Does this infomiation make it more
or less credible that he really will skip dinner?" (\99A, p. 736).
112. See Alesina and Roubini with Cohen (1997); and in the context of the United
States, Fair (1996).
113. Gt«ider(I987, p. 473).
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situations provide a set of tests for the signaling model, as discussed
below.
Even if temporarily high interest rates do have an effect on beliefs,
and therefore on the supply curve of capital, one should still ask whether
there are less costly signaling mechanisms—or at least, signaling mech-
anisms that are less costly to innocent bystanders, if more so to those
engaged in risky behavior. Such mechanisms would provide better in-
centives to prevent future crises, while restoring confidence in the midst
ofthe current crisis."-' This is an especially relevant question for inter-
national institutions, which may be in a position to help the market
coordinate on a signaling system.
The hypothesis that high interest rates are an effective signaling
mechanism can also be subjected to empirical tests. The information
contained in the signal would presumably be related to prior information
and beliefs. Thus one would expect a high interest rate policy to be less
effective in conveying information about a monetary authority that had
a long reputation for responsible monetary policy, as evidenced by low
inflation, because the revision in beliefs would presumably be smaller.
This strongly suggests that even if one believes in the signaling theory,
a high interest rate policy would be less effective in East Asia than it
was in Latin America. The East Asian experience of currencies contin-
uing to depreciate after initial interest rate hikes seems consistent with
this hypothesis, as we discuss below.
Indeed, one might go further if one believed that the underlying
problem was not a tnacroeconomic problem but observed thai the mon-
etary authorities were acting as if it were. Then one might rationally
infer that the monetary authorities did not understand the issue. Attack-
ing a financial sector crisis with an instrument that is not directly related
is not likely to enhance the credibility of the financial authorities or
confidence in the economy.
Moreover, information is typically conveyed not only by the level
ofthe interest rate, but also by its duration. Indeed, the standard expla-
nation for the failure of high interest rates is that the countries have not
stayed the course. This proposition can also be tested empirically.
114. One possibility Is that govemment interventions imposing Pigouvian corrective
taxes on those activities that generated the systemic risks and using the revenues to
provide for improved safety nets wlil. in addition to their direct benefits, send a signal
that reform efforts will be politically and socially sustainable.
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MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA. The Other major set of models providing a
consistent rationale for higher interest rates as a tneans of stabilizing
the exchange rate are those that generate multiple equilibria. Although
the results are not in, we doubt that these justifications will stand up
under close scrutiny. In such models, government intervention can
sometimes help to coordinate the economy to "choose" the good equi-
librium. Having intervened to convince market participants which equi-
librium would prevail, the government can step aside. In principle,
anything can serve to coordinate such sunspot equilibria; and govern-
ments should, presumably, choose coordinating signals that do not in
themselves have adverse effects in changing the equilibria.
There is a further problem: the coordination signal may be misinter-
preted. Rather than restoring the economy to the former, higher ex-
change rate equilibrium, it may reinforce the movement toward the low
exchange rate equilibrium. This is especially likely if there is a belief
that the former, stronger exchange rate is no longer an equilibrium, due
to the increased interest rate, as the weakening economy saps confi-
dence in the currency and generates capital Hight.
Proponents of high interest rates thus have a heavy burden. They
need to construct a multiple equilibria model in which high interest
rates result in coordination on a "good" equilibrium. They must also
devise convincing tests that high interest rates indeed serve as the co-
ordinating mechanism and show that it would be difficult, if not im-
possible, to establish less costly coordinating mechanisms. The litera-
ture is not replete with models that satisfy these criteria.
It is easy, however, to construct multiple equilibrium models in
which government intervention in the form of sufficiently higher inter-
est rates eliminates the "good" equilibrium, while the retnaining stable
equilibrium is discretely lower. Normally, exchange rate depreciation
leads to increased exports, and thus a greater demand for local currency.
But a very large depreciation can result in a substantially higher prob-
ability that firms will default on their foreign-currency-denominated
debts. This, together with weaker economic conditions, reduces capital
inflows, resulting in a decrease in the demand for the currency that
more than offsets the increased demand for local currency to buy ex-
ports. Giffen-Iike demand curves (as well as backward-bending supply
curves) can give rise to multiple equilibria. In an intertemporal model,
exchange rates today depend on expectations about the equilibrium
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exchange rate in the future. Higher interest rates, leading to lower
investment and less competitiveness, yield lower exchange rates in the
future. More important, the resulting shifts in the demand and supply
curves may eliminate the upper equilibrium exchange rate.
Temporary Interest Rate Increases and Permanently Weaker
Exchange Rates
In our discussion of the contemporaneous relationship between in-
terest rates and exchange rates, we have emphasized the roles of the
probability of bankruptcy and increased uncertainty about the future.
Developments in finance-based macroeconomics over the past two dec-
ades provide a strong basis for believing that these phenomena may be
highly persistent. Thus a period of temporarily higher interest rates may
lead to a permanent or long-lived increase in the probability of default.
In this case, the conventional wisdom about contemporaneous effects
could be correct (the effect of higher interest rates could outweigh the
higher default probability in the short run. and thus increase the ex-
pected return) and a higher interest rate could still lead to a lower
exchange rate. The reason is simple: in the long run, when interest rates
retum to their original level, the expected return will be lower, because
the probability of default will have increased. Even if the intermediate-
run exchange rate is unchanged, the exchange rate in preceding periods
will have weakened through the standard equations. And the weaker
economy might in fact lead to a weaker intermediate-run exchange rate,
further weakening the currency in the preceding periods. It is thus
possible that today's exchange rate could be weakened, even if today's
expected return increased.
To understand why and under what circumstances increasing interest
rates today leads to permanently^that is, in the short to intermediate
term—weaker future exchange rates, it is important to understand the
financial and macroeconomic effects of high interest rates and why they
persist. We describe six important channels through which interest rates
affect the economy.
NET WORTH. Higher interest rates seriously erode the net worth of
debtors, leading them to contract investment, employment, inventories,
and production.'" Since it takes time for the depletion of net worth to
115. See Greenwald and Stigliu (1988. 1993).
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be restored, these effects outlast the increase in interest rates. More-
over, increases in interest rates lead to a decrease in asset values, further
undermining the value of banks, which cannot avoid having long-term
assets and short-term liabilities. Even in a closed economy this has
serious adverse macroeconomic effects, because the actions of those
who gain (net creditors) typically do not fully offset the contractionary
actions of the losers. But in an open economy, with net payments
flowing abroad, there is a real wealth effect on the econotny as a whole.
PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL FLIGHT. Changes in asset values and ex-
pected returns caused by higher interest rates lead to portfolio reallo-
cation. While a higher interest rate, by itself, might tnake it more
attractive to hold a country's interest-bearing assets, the attraction will
in part be offset by the higher probability of default and the generally
perceived higher riskiness. Furthermore, the markedly lower value of
net worth will, if there is decreasing absolute risk aversion, reduce
demand for risky assets. This will be especially important for domestic
investors who. in the face of an impending recession, see the value of
their human capital—which is relatively country specific—go down
and the variance of its return increase. Since the return on domestic
assets is highly correlated with that on human capital, the desire for
diversification will lead to a portfolio shift away from domestic assets.
Indeed, becau.se domestic investors are better informed about the prob-
lems in their own country, they are often the first to move their money
out."" In the East Asian crisis, much ofthe international diversification
by residents of the affected countries involved investing money in other
East Asian countries. Subsequent events have shown just how corre-
lated these returns are: further withdrawals of capital from the region
result as Koreans, for instance, move their money out of Indonesia and
into Mexico or the United States."^ Exacerbating this tendency is the
116. See Frankel and Schmukler (1996. 1997) for evidence from the discounts of
closed-end mutual funds holding assets in emerging markets. In surveys of local firms
conducted in December 1996, a large fraction of respondents in Korea and Thailand
answered yes to the questions "Is a recession over the next year likely?" and "Is the
exchange rate in your country expected lo be volatile?" By contrast. Indonesian and
Malaysian firms did not seem to see the crisis coming any more than foreign investors
did. See Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Schmukler (1998).
117. Collier. Hoeftier. and Paltillo (1998) estimate that rebalancing portfolios in
East Asia will eventually lead to a cumulative outflow of $80 biilion, although they do
not predict how long this adjustment will take.
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anticipation of the future taxes that will need to be imposed to repay
debt, particularly if the government assumes the responsibility, as in
Latin America in the 1980s. Together, these factors explain why gross
capital outflows by domestic residents—often called capital flight—
have played such an important role in past crises, including Mexico in
1994-95 and Indonesia in 1997.""
BANKRuncY. Many firms will find their net worth so compromised
as a result of higher interest rates that they go bankrupt. Bankruptcy
may have severe disruptive effects, even with well-functioning bank-
ruptcy law with some equivalent of chapter 11 ofthe U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. In some cases, bankruptcy has adverse effects on the net worth
of a firm's creditors; this is especially true of financial institutions.""
To offset the effects of bankruptcy, new firms will have to be created,
and old firms expanded. Neither outcome is typical in the midst of a
recession, discouraged by uncertainly about the future, the high fixed
costs of investment, and the even higher fixed, sunk costs of starting a
new enterprise. Furthermore, the firm's core asset, its organizational
capital, dissipates quickly after it is shut down, and it is a lengthy and
costly process to rebuild it. This is reflected in the well-known obser-
vation that the vaiue of a firm as an ongoing enterprise is far greater
than the value of the assets that constitute it. Bankruptcy and net worth
effects are likely to be especially large where debt-to-equity ratios are
very high, as they have been in Korea.
MORAL HAZARD. In the presence of bankruptcy laws, the decrease in
net worth resulting frotn higher interest rales may lead some firms to
engage in gambling or looting behavior.'^" Such behavior within the
financial sector has been credited with exacerbating its problems of that
sector and amplifying its losses, for exatnpic, in the U.S. savings and
loans debacle in the United States. While strong regulatory behavior
might be able to reduce the magnitude of this effect, it takes time to
develop; in the meanwhile, there are real dangers.
AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT. As financial institutions go bankrupt and
118. On Mexico, see International Monetary Fund (1995); on Indonesia Dooley
(1998).
119. This is so because bankruptcy represents a discontinuity, often with a discrete
decrease in value. It is especially apparent when there is a discrepancy between the
value of Ihe assets of a company sold as a going Rrtii and those assets sold separately.
120. See Akerlof and Romer (1993).
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banks cut back on their lending, credit may become highly constrained.
A credit crunch will exacerbate the economic downturn. The severe
liquidity constraints imposed by the weakening ofthe financial system,
especially if capital adequacy standards are stringently enforced, make
it difficult for firms to find outside financing, and the low level of profits
associated with economic downturn make it difficult to finance invest-
ment expansions internally.'^' Thus even short-lived interest rate hikes
can have persistent negative effects.'^^
INFORMATION. Because interest rates change asset values, and be-
cause information concerning the asset structure of a firm is almost
always imperfect, large changes in interest rates increase the imperfec-
tions of such information. These adverse information effects exacerbate
the constant problems of making good resource aliocation (lending)
decisions, increase risk premiums, and thereby contribute further to the
contraction of the economy. And as shown above, an increase in the
imperfection of information can lead to greater credit rationing. More-
over, as banks and firms go bankrupt, there is an enormous loss in
informational capital: the specific information that banks have about
firms and that firms have about their suppliers and customers.
These six effects of higher interest rates on the economy combine to
induce a leftward shift in the aggregate supply curve, which is mutually
reinforcing with the leftward shift in the aggregate demand curve that
has been the subject of traditional macroeconomic discussions. As firms
reduce their employment, aggregate demand is reduced further; as the
uncertainty of the reduction in credit availability and the anxiety caused
by increased bankruptcies grow, even firms that do not face credit
121. Worse still, the higher interest rates offered on government securities induce
banks lo hold their assets there—especially if govemment indebtedness is low. so that
the probability of default is low—rather than lending. In response to the observation
that some banks are awash with liquidity, naive observers have argued that there is no
credit crunch: Ihere is simply not an adequate supply of creditworthy borrowers (clearly,
there may he relatively few creditworthy borrowers who are willing to pay the extremely
high interest rates being charged). Moreover, they have argued that the government
should contract the money supply, since ihe excessive liquidity represents ati inflationary
threat. The implicit worry is that circutnstances might change quickly and dramatically
hefore monetary authorities could react, so thai all the excess liquidity would turn into
inflationary spending. In reality, tbey should be worried thai in ihe aiiempt to reduce
excess liquidity the credit crunch be exacerbated, since both banks that have excess
liquidity and those that do noi are likely to be affected.
122. See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993).
Jason Furman and Joseph E. StigUtz S7
constraints may reduce their demand for investment. The reduced
demand pushes more firms into bankruptcy, further exacerbating the
supply-side effects.
These effects provide the motivation for our claim that the probability
of bankruptcy and the increase in uncertainty are increasing functions
of the interest rate. But they go further, to argue that a period of
temporarily high interest rates could have the persistent effect of in-
creasing the probability of bankruptcy, and thus lower the expected
return and the exchange rate long after interest rates have returned to
more normal levels.
Comparing the Models
We have discussed several cases in which a speculative attack on a
currency is followed by temporarily high interest rates. During the
period of high interest rates, the movement of the exchange rates de-
pends on the strength ofthe offsetting movements in the promised rate
of return and the probability of bankruptcy and increase in the risk
premium. When the high interest rates are brought down again, in the
most basic specification the exchange rate would return to its precrisis
levels. The exchange rate could be permanently strengthened if favor-
able reforms are introduced in the meantime, or the signaling effect is
positive, or the economy is coordinated to a new equilibrium. But it
could be permanently—or at least persistently—weakened if the period
of high interest rates leads to a long-lasting increase in the probability
of bankruptcy.
Which of these alternatives prevails depends on two important fac-
tors: the degree to which a period of high interest rates signals important
information about the monetary authority and the degree to which high
interest rates harm the economy. In Latin America, capital markets are
highly segmented, so that an increase in. say, a bank's discount rate or
the interbank lending rate does not get translated into higher lending
rates for most borrowers. The effects are also likely to be limited when
firms are not highly indebted or when most debt is long-term debt. That
is why increases in interest rates may have worked to stabilize Latin
American currencies—although in some cases they entailed substantial
macroeconomic sacrifices.
But in East Asia, firms were highly levetaged, banks were very
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fragile, capital markets were not highly segmented, and much of the
debt was short term. Moreover, aggregate demand and supply were
initially roughly in balance. Not surprisingly, raising interest rates had
significant adverse macroeconomic effects. These large macroeconomic
effects, combined with high indebtedness, led to a large increase in the
probability of bankruptcy, lowering expected returns, and thus making
investments less attractive in these countries.
In appendix B we prove the general theorem that if there is initially
some credit rationing in a country, such adverse macroeconomic effects
always increase credit rationing: some loans that would have been rolled
over are not. These effects are compounded by capital flight, which
will be exacerbated by the increase in interest rates when there are large
adverse macroeconomic consequences and a heavy level of indebted-
ness, some of which is expected to be assumed by the government, and
thus reflected in higher taxes.
The situation in East Asia in 1997 was sufficiently different from
that of Latin America in the 1980s and mid-1990s that the prospects for
higher interest rales stabilizing exchange rates were clearly bleak.
Empirical Evidence
There is remarkably little empirical research on the use of temporar-
ily restrictive monetary policy to defend the exchange rate in a crisis.
By contrast, the belief is widespread that this defense will work in a
wide range of circumstances. To date, the arguments made in its favor
have mostly been stories. It is argued that temporarily high interest
rates successfully defended against speculative attacks in several Latin
American countries. Yet Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land followed the classic prescription of raising their interest rates to
defend their currencies, and all three saw continued depreciations, well
in excess of what would be predicted by the currency crisis models
examined above or by estimates of the overvaluation of these curren-
cies. In both Latin America and East Asia, many other factors were at
work, and one could argue that the exchange rate depreciations would
have been even larger in the absence of high interest rates, or equiva-
lently, that interest rates were not raised high enough. And this reason-
ing could be reversed to undermine the Latin American example: per-
haps exchange rates would have stabilized on their own, or with a far
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more moderate increase in interest rates. The problem is to establish
the counterfactual. This kind of storytelling is useful, in that it alerts
one to the possibility—already suggested by our theoretical analysis
that there may be circumstances in which higher interest rates work,
and others in which they do not. To go beyond storytelling, one needs
empirical research that will confirm or reject the theoretical predictions
about the likelihood that such policies will work.
The only empirical studies on this issue of which we are aware are
by Aart Kraay and by Goldfajn and Poonam Gupta.'" Kraay identifies
313 speculative attacks on currencies, defined as large drops in reserves
or large depreciations in the exchange rate. In 192 of these cases the
attack was successfully defended, and although non-gold reserves de-
creased, the exchange rate did not experience a substantial deprecia-
tion.'^^ Kraay then asks whether the stance of monetary policy helps to
explain why some of the speculative attacks were thwarted. He finds
no evidence that tighter monetary policy, defined as a higher discount
rate relative to the United States or slower domestic credit growth,
played a role in defending the exchange rate. This result is confirmed
in several different samples and specifications, including a more com-
plete model that includes other determinants of crises.
Goldfajn and Gupta look at a iarge sample of real exchange rate "un-
dervaluation" episodes following crises to assess whether tight monetary
policy brings about a recovery in the real exchange rate through a nominal
appreciation of the exchange rate. They find that in their total sample,
tight monetary policy increases the probability of recovery by about 10
percentage points. But among countries undergoing simultaneous banking
and currency crises, as in East Asia, tight monetary policy is associated
with a roughly 10 percentage point lower probability of success. Both of
these differences are statistically significant.
The advantage of the monthly framework used by these studies is
that it can identify a large sample and examine a rich set of variables.
The cost, however, is that monthly variables necessarily miss much of
the action in currency attacks, which can take place over the course of
a few days. Also, the methodology of these studies ignores episodes
123. Kraay (1998): Goldfajn and Gupta (1998).
124. See Kraay (1998) for the preci.se nutnerical thresholds atid other conditions for
successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks.
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when high interest rates were sufficient to deter a speculative attack in
the first place.
We try to clarify the relationship between temporarily restrictive
monetary poiicy and the exchange rate with two sets of evidence. First,
we present a detailed discussion of the contrast between the recent crises
in Brazil, where tight monetary policy worked, and in Indonesia, where
it did not. Second, we takes a more systematic look at episodes of
temporarily high interest rates in developing countries.
INDONESIA VERSUS BRAZIL. When speculativc pressures on the Bra-
zilian real increased in October 1997, the authorities responded by
raising the overnight interest rate from 30 percent to 70 percent, with
most of the increase coming in one day. Interest rates stayed at high
levels for almost two months, until they were brought down to pre-
attack levels by the Brazilian authorities. The exchange rate maintained
its upward trajectory even after the rates were lowered. Brazil's ex-
change and interest rates are portrayed in figure 9.
Indonesia's experience, shown in figure 10, stands in sharp contrast
to that of Brazil. In the aftermath of Thailand's devaluation on July 2,
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Figure 10. Exchange Rales and Interest Rates in Indonesia, 1997-98"
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1997, the rupiah fell by around 7 percent over the course of thai month.
In mid-August speculative pressures intensified and the rupiah fell by
another 10 percent. The authorities responded by raising interest rates
from 20 percent to almost 100 percent. After one and a half months,
they tried to lower interest rates, only to see the exchange rate slip, so
that they quickly raised interest rates again. By late September, interest
rates had come down to 40 percent—20 percentage points higher than
their precrisis levels—but the exchange rate began to fall sharply.
In both of these cases, high interest rates seemed to prevent the
currency from depreciating, but only in Brazil did the exchange rate
maintain its value after interest rates were reduced. We have discussed
three different models for interpreting this experience. In terms of the
first, Brazil was subject to a temporary shock, whereas Indonesia was
subject to a much larger permanent shock. Brazil's temporary shock
could have been a period of irrational contagion, and the high interest
rates would have defended the currency until the market regained its
senses. In contrast, the attack on the rupiah was more rational and could
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not be defended; when interest rates were reduced, the exchange rate
quickly depreciated to its equilibrium value.
Although a definitive counterfactual is impossible, most estimates of
real exchange rate misalignment would have suggested that the Brazil-
ian real was more overvalued than the Indonesian rupiah in August
1997. In fact, by the middle of that month the rupiah had already fallen
so far that its real exchange rate was more depreciated than in 1989-
91. Similarly, based on the standard macroeconomic and financial in-
dicators, one would have expected the real to be in more trouble than
the rupiah: Brazil is rated as more vulnerable than Indonesia in all of
the crisis prediction models reviewed in the previous section.
The other two models are more promising. Brazil would be a prime
candidate forthe signaling model. It had a long history of high inflation,
which had recently been brought under control with little, if any, cost
to aggregate output or unemployment. The period of high interest rates
might have provided substantial information about the government's
willingness to take costly measures to maintain its exchange rate {a de
facto crawling peg), and thus its nominal anchor. In contrast, Indonesia
had followed a much more prudent monetary policy, keeping the infla-
tion rate under 20 percent for over two decades. The information con-
tent in the Indonesian government's signal would have been much less.
Finally, Indonesia's economy was much more sensitive to high in-
terest rates than Brazil's, due to its greater financial fragility and the
fact that unlike Brazil's its interest rates tend to move together. As a
result, there was a much greater increase in the probability of bank-
ruptcy in Indonesia, and thus the direct economic effect ofthe interest
rate hikes was probably to weaken, rather than strengthen, the equilib-
rium exchange rate.
THE HIGH INTEREST RATE DEFENSE. The Contrast between Indonesia
and Brazil can be generalized to the experience of a number of devel-
oping countries. We look at periods of temporarily high interest rates,
defined as episodes when the average interest rate rises by more than
10 percentage points relative to its starting value for at least five trading
days, after which interest rates are reduced again. We use our judgment
to determine the precise starting and ending dates of these episodes.
The sample is restricted to the countries included in the emerging mar-
kets index of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). However,
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many of the countries either had no data on short-term interest rates or
no usable data; for example, their daily interest rate series were ex-
tremely erratic. Data limitations also restrict the sample to the period
January 1992 to June 1998, although several countries have even shorter
series. Finally, a number of countries have good data but do not have
any episodes that match our criteria for a high interest rate defense.
This leave nine countries with at least one episode of temporarily high
interest rates: Argentina, Brazil, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia,
Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, and Slovakia. Table 7 presents data
about these episodes and the associated exchange rates.
From eyeballing the data, there appears to be a negative relationship
between either the magnitude of the interest rate hike or its duration
and the eventual outcome for the exchange rate. Our theory, however,
predicts that the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates
will depend on initial conditions. One natural formalization is to interact
the magnitude and duration ofthe interest rate hikes with a dummy that
takes the value of 1 for countries with average inflation rates above 40
percent, and 0 otherwise. In table 8 we regress the change in the ex-
change rate on the magnitude and duration variables, with and without
the degree of real misalignment as a control (columns I and 2, respec-
tively). An altemative regression looks at the effect of the cumulative
rise in interest rates, the product ofthe duration and average magnitude
ofthe interest rate hike. This is also shown with and without the degree
of real misalignment as a control {columns 3 and 4, respectively).
The results are very consistent across countries. In low Inflation
countries, each additional day of high interest rates tends to lead to an
additional depreciation of roughly 0.3 percent. The sign of the effect
of the average level of interest rates during the defense period is also
negative, but is not significant. In the high-inflation countries, the point
estimates of the effects of both the duration and magnitude of the interest
rate hike are also negative, but insignificantly different from zero. The
regressions of exchange rate depreciation on the total magnitude of the
interest rate hike (that is, its duration multiplied by the average mag-
nitude) yield similar conclusions. In low-inflation countries, the even-
tual depreciation is increasing in the total magnitude of the interest rate
hike. The same result obtains for high-inflation countries, although the
effect is substantially smaller. To give some sense of size, if a low-
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Tabte 7. Effect of Temporarily High Interest Rates on Exchange Rates
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inflation country raised its interest rates by 20 percent for twenty days,
it would see a depreciation of 6.0 percent; the same policy in a high-
inflation country would lead to a depreciation of 0.9 percent.
So far. we have discussed these results as if they expressed a causal
link between interest rates and exchange rates. In reality, this interpre-
tation is fraught with all ofthe difficulties we described above concern-
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liable 8. I^ression Results Explaining Exchange Rate Depreciations
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ing endogeneity. The more important result is that the behavior of the
two subsamples is very different. In this sense, it is simply a formal
generalization of the Brazil versus Indonesia story.
Also, we call our dummy variable high inflation. We could just as
well have called it Latin America, or any other variable that distin-
guishes Latin America from the rest of the world. With so little data,
it would be impossible to test the validity of the various theories about
why Latin America is different.
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We recognize that these results are not definitive evidence of the
effect of tight monetary poiicy on the ability to defend the exchange
rate. But they are consistent with the theoretical models described
above, and also with the contrasting stories of Brazil and Indonesia
about signaling and the economic costs of higher interest rates. At the
very least, they question the presumption that increasing interest rates
is an effective mechanism for defending the exchange rate, especially
in the case of low-inflation countries, such as those of East Asia.
Policy Implications
If temporarily high interest rates lead to a weaker exchange rate
today, the high interest rate policy will be strictly dominated. If they
strengthen today's exchange rate but lead to a permanently weaker
exchange rate, there wili aiso be iittie basis for favoring this poiicy.
The tougher case is when higher interest rates do strengthen the ex-
change rate, today and in the future, but at a macroeconomic cost. How
does one evaluate this trade-off?
Many of the factors of the positive analysis also appear in this nor-
mative analysis. If, for instance, credit markets are highly segmented,
an increase in the policy interest rate may not affect the interest rates
faced by many borrowers, and thus it would be relatively costless. By
contrast, where leveraging is high, high interest rates will be very
costly, in terms of weakening aggregate demand and increasing the
number of bankruptcies. Even if the itTipact of increasing the probability
of bankruptcies did not outweigh the higher promised return, so that
the exchange rate is strengthened, the cost may be substantially higher
than is justified.
In addition, both exchange rate depreciations and interest rate in-
creases create winners and losers, and one needs to look at the distri-
bution of these gains and losses and the net magnitude of their impact.
With a weaker exchange rate, exporters and net holders of foreign assets
will benefit, while those relying on imports and net debtors in foreign
currency will be hurt, in general, it is expected that the consequent rise
in net exports will increase overall output, although this need not be
the case for very large devaluations, which may increase bankruptcies
just as do high interest rates.'" Unexpected increases in interest rates
125. See, for instance, the discussion in Agnor and Montiel (1996, chap. 7).
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hurt variable rate debtors and fixed rate creditors, while helping fixed
rate debtors and variable rate creditors. As a resuit, they weaken Hnan-
cial institutions. This effect, along with others discussed below, typi-
cally leads to lower investment and thus, lower overall output.
The evaluation of these trade-offs will depend on the circumstances.
In general, there are three reasons why one might be disposed toward
keeping the interest rate down and letting the exchange rate depreciate.
First, from the perspective of avoiding a crisis—and focusing pri-
mariiy on the likelihood that one will occur—Demirgli^-Kunt and
Detragiache find that there should be greater concern about interest rate
increases than exchange rate decreases.'-" This should not come as a
surprise. Well-managed firms can usually find cover for their exchange
rate risk. But even well-managed firms will have some indebtedness
that leaves them exposed to huge increases in interest rates, especially
when those increases are associated with an economic downturn.
Their results describe the typical country. Looking more specifically
at the East Asian countries, one would expect these to be especially
sensitive to increases in interest rates; but in at least some cases, there
are reasons to believe that sensitivity to exchange rate risks was at or
below average. The foreign exchange exposure of Malaysian firms and
banks was very low, for example, partly because of the government's
active policies limiting such exposure. Thus it seems likely that a high-
interest-rate policy would have been especially misguided. And a recent
survey of industrial firms in Thailand shows that much of the foreign
indebtedness was held by exporting firms; these firms were at least
partially covered, as they would have gained in the value of their exports
part of what they lost in the increased vaiue of their liabilities.'" To be
sure, there were some real estate ventures with iarge foreign exchange
exposures; but given the huge vacancy rate and plummeting real estate
prices, these would have gone bankrupt in any case. This observation
emphasizes the importance of looking at the marginal impact of policy,
for example, on bankruptcy and economic disruption more generally.''"
126. Demirgu^-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a).
127. Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (1998).
128. One should also look at the duration of the effects. We have established that even
temporarily high interest rates have effects that persist long after these rates have been
lowered. What atniut exchange rate eltects? In many cases, the defense of the exchange
rate proves to be pointless: there is a lower permanent exchange rate, and the costs of
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High interest rates have adverse effects on all firms with short-term
debt, including small firms that never gambled by taking on liabilities
denominated in foreign exchange. Very high interest rates can bring
bankruptcy even to firms with moderate indebtedness.'-"
The second reason is a version of the moral hazard argument. If it is
believed that governments will act to stabilize the exchange rate, investors
and others will be encouraged to take positions that they otherwise would
not—and once they have taken these positions, the govemment may be
forced to support the exchange rate, to avoid large adverse effects. The
govemment must commit to not intervening to stabilize the exchange rate,
either directiy or through interest rate policies. Any intervention reinforces
the belief that the govemment will be there to help stabilize the exchange
rate. While in principle those who take a foreign exchange position could
obtain a hedge, the maturity mismatch that characterized the East Asian
crisis is an inherent part of all financial markets. '^ " An increase in interest
rate volatility might increase the demand for longer term loans, which
could have adverse effects on firm behavior. It is also likely to lead to
lower willingness to borrow more generally, and this, too. will have an
adverse effect on overall economic growth.'"
The third grounds for preferring exchange rate decreases is equity.
Why should borrowers in general, workers, and firms, all of whotn will
be adversely affected by the increase in interest rates, be made to pay
the price of speculators" profit?"- Only if it were shown, contrary to
delaying adjustmeni may well exceed the benefits. A temporarily lower exchange rate does
have persistent effects. On one side, exporlcrs are better off. as a result of their increased
net worth. On the other side, the adverse effect on producers of nontradables depends both
on the magnitude of their import.s and the speed of adjustment of output prices. Those with
foreign-denominated debts are worse off. but only to the extent that during the peticxl of
temporarily low exchange rates they had to make payments for which they were not covered.
Those with foreign-denominated assets are better off.
129. In the very short run, firms in the noniradable sector thai use tradable mputs
will be adversely afleeted by the depreciating currency; but as output prices adjust to
their new equilibrium value, the impact is limited to tbe inevitable disruption associated
with the reallocalion of resources from one sector of the economy to another.
130. A consequence of a natural mismatch between the longevity of assets and the
desire of depositors for short-term liquidity; see Rey and Stiglitz (1993).
131. The lower willingness to borTOW will result in less depth in the financial mar-
kets. Depth of financial markets has been shown to be significantly correlated with
economic growth; for an excellent survey, see Levine (1997).
132. One might argue that successfully defending the exchange rate prevents spec-
ulators from making a profit. Our point is that when the government wagers its reserves
Jason Furman and Joseph E. Stiglitz 99
our results above, that the economy as a whole will benefit, would an
increase in interest rates be desirable.'"
Concluding Remarks
As we write, the East Asia crisis has entered a second stage: while
financial variables have now stabilized in several countries, all of the
affected countries have moved into deep recessions, if not depres-
sions."" This paper is concerned with diagnosing the causes of the East
Asian crisis and assessing how appropriate have been the remedies.
This is imperative if we are to improve our ability to respond to future
crises and to make such crises less likely and. in the event, less deep.
While we focus on the circumstances leading up to the crisis and the
responses in the months immediately following its onset, many of these
issues remain, as the affected countries face the challenge of recovering
from deep recession. Recovery will require addressing the problems of
insufficient aggregate demand and huge disturbances to aggregate sup-
ply. Tackling both sides of this equation simultaneously will require
careful attention to financial institutions and the link between the finan-
cial and real sectors; and also a deeper understanding of the role of
bankruptcy than was manifested in the design of the initial responses.'"
in defense of Ihe currency, it is often making a one-way bet. where the expected loss is
speculators' expected gain- [n contrast, if the government does not wager any reserves,
the gains of some speculators are simply the losses of others.
133. Given a social welfare function that cares about distribution, the conditions are
even more stringent. One needs to show either thai the disadvantaged are compensated
(which they almost never are) or that the benefits to those who gain are sufficiently large
that they offset the iosses to others, taking into account the fact that those who are hurt,
such as small businesse.s and workers, typically are poorer than those who bencHt.
134. There is no standard definition of a depression as distinct from a deep recession.
A depression is sometimes defined as a 25 percent contraction, based on the fact that
U.S. GDP contracted by 26 percent between 1929 and 1932. By this definition, many
forecasters foresee the possibility of a depression in Indonesia, but not in the other
countries in the region.
135. Problems are apparent on both scores. In discussions of capital adequacy stan-
dards, forebearance. and the resolution of bankruptcy, insufficient attention has been
paid, on the one hand, to the difference between a bankruptcy in a single firm and the
kind of systemic bankruptcy currently faced by Indonesia, where an estimated 75 percent
of firms are insolvent; and on the other hand, to the difference between lack of capital
in a single bank and a systemic financial sector problem.
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Cycles and financial panics have characterized capitalist economies
over the past two centuries, and though the duration of expansions has
become longer, and that of recessions shorter since World War 11. there
is no reason to believe that cyclical fluctuations will disappear.'^" Pre-
sumably, good macroeconomic management might be able to lengthen
the expansions and both shorten the contractions and reduce their depth.
But given the ubiquity of fluctuations, it is hard to attach too much
blame to the occurrence of a downturn. The East Asian countries have
been remarkable not only for the strength of their growth, but for the
infrequency of their downturns. Yet the severity of the current crisis
inevitably raises questions about the.se countries' policies, as well as
the evolving international architecture and the international confimu-
nity's respon.se.
In this respect, the paper has several broad themes. First, the crisis
was the result of private decisions gone wrong—both those of lenders
in industrial countries and those of East Asian borrowers. To understand
what caused the crisis, and what could have been done to prevent it.
requires a theoretical perspective that integrates the financial sector with
the real sector and incorporates market imperfections. Instead, many
analysts have relied on an inconsistent model: on the one hand, justi-
fying the advocacy of capital account liberalization on the basis of the
efficiency of free markets; while on the other hand, worrying about
whether the market valuation of the exchange rate was correct and
pushing for the release of more information about quantities (for ex-
ample, of short-term debt) when these are not required under the per-
fectly confipetitive model. "^
Past experience shows that economic downturns associated with fi-
136. In the United States, the average recession. a.s dated by the National Bureau of
Economic Research, fell from twenty-one months over 1854—1929 to eleven months
over 1945-91. At the same time, the average expansion has grown from twenty-five
months lo fifty months {Joseph E. Stiglitz. "Sound Finance and Sustainable Develop-
ment in Asia." speech to the Asia Development Forum. Manila. March 12. 1998;
available on the worldwide web). Assessment of changes in historical volalilily through
business cycle dating does not require accurate measures for every subcomponent of
GDP and can also employ other. non-GDP data. As a result, it is more robust against
Romer's (1986) criticism about spurious volatility in historical GDP data.
!37. This justitication ot capital account liberalization is advanced even though
recent literature has estahlished that whenever there is imperfect information and incom-
plete markets—certainly an apt description of the East Asian countries—markets are
not even constrained Pareto efficient; see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
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nancial crises are markedly different from those associated with, say.
inventory cycles: that they tend to be more severe, with longer lasting
effects; that high leverage on the part of firms and high lending in a
real estate boom contribute to financial fragility; that bankruptcy has
severe consequences, especially in the case of financial institutions,
with the associated collapse of the credit mechanism; that large unan-
ticipated increases in interest rates can have severe adverse effects,
both in precipitating a crisis and leading to a real economic downturn.
as the asset values of banks fall and the net worth of highly indebted
firms quickly erodes; and that these adverse effects persist even after
the interest rate has returned to more normal levels. Research over the
past two decades has not only significantly advanced understanding of
financial markets, but has shown how those insights can be integrated
into macroeconomic models; macroeconomic models in which financial
markets are "summarized" in a money demand equation are of little
use—indeed, they are likely to be highly misleading.
Had policymakers placed greater reliance on economic models that
integrated finance and macroeconomics and that recognized more fully
the complexity of appropriate regulation of financial markets—that re-
liance on capital adequacy standards may not suffice and in general is
not Pareto efficient—they might have been able to mitigate the severity
of the current downturn. Such models would have forced a recognition
that preventing and responding to crises requires a broad range of in-
struments, including those that stabilize and ensure the safety and
soundness of financial and capital markets. Standard forecasting
models, incorporating reasonable assumptions of lags, suggest that the
onset of a crisis will be followed by a severe downturn that would be
exacerbated by fiscal contraction, such as targeting a zero deficit, even
if that deficit only included interest on the financing costs of restructur-
ing the banking system. Policy designs that took more explicit account
of dynamics—not only the lags, but the irreversibilities and persistence
associated with reduced net worth and bankruptcy—and were based on
a Bayesian statistical decision framework would likely have achieved
far better outcomes.'^"
138. It should have been obvious that there were risks associated with any policy, and
that who bear those risks differed markedly among policies. Thus, the decision about the
appropriate policy was not a mere technical decision, to be left to government bureacrats.
either within the country or in international agencies, but an intensely political one.
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Second, the research to date has little to contribute to the discussion.
The variables typically ascribed to major roles in the crisis do not seem
to have high predictive value in a wider sample of countries. And while
some have been tempted to fit a model using a single data point, or
even four data points, this approach does not advance one's understand-
ing much, and certainly does not prepare one to prevent the next crisis.
Third, in the debate over how to cope with capital infiows and with
rapid capital outfiows, the disagreements among economists counsel a
degree of humility. We do not have all the answers.'^'* In our discussion
of macroeconomic policy, we have tried to show that the "correct"
answers were far from obvious at the time the decisions were made,
and even with the benefit of hindsight. Under these circumstances,
blaming the victims while ignoring those who willingly lent to them is
unfair at best, and at worst can lead to counterproductive responses.
Finally, it is necessary to reexamine some aspects of the international
economic architecture, those that relate to short-term capital flows in
particular, to ask whether it exposes developing countries to significant
risks without commensurate returns. If a single car has an accident on
a road, there is a presumption that the driver made an error; if there are
repeated accidents at the same curve, then the presumption should be
that the road is badly designed. The key issue is not whether the social
risk is equal to the private risk—there can be little doubt that it does
not—but whether and how one can design policies whose benefits out-
weigh their ancillary costs. The international response to the East Asian
crisis makes clear that we lack evidence on many crucial issues, and
that much more research is needed.
APPENDIX A
Empirical Estimation of Prediction Models
IN OUR EMPIRICAL estimations of the three currency crisis prediction
models, we try to stick as closely as possible to their sources and
139. In part the disagreements arise from the paucity of relevant data. But more
broadly, to some extent they are based on differences of interests and ideologies. In any
case, the fact that the available evidence can be interpreted in such dilfereni ways
supports the view that economic policy is not just a technical matters, to be resolved by
technicians.
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definitions. This appendix indicates only the ways in which our data,
definitions, and coverage differ; for complete sources and definitions,
piea.se see the original papers. We assess the banking crisis model of
Demirgug-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) on the basis of their own
calculations.
Frankel and Rose (1996)
We use the same definitions and sources as in the original paper,
except that we use IMF and World Bank staff estimates of the trade-
weighted real exchange rate relative to its average value in 1989-91.
The left-hand-side crisis variable runs from 1980 to 1996, and the right-
hand-side variables are lagged by one year. There are 104 countries in
the sample (all the countries for which at least one data point is avail-
able), and 766 usable observations out of 1,768 possible observations.
The probit regression coefficients, estimated by maximum likelihood,
are given in table AI. We use these to calculate the probabilities shown
in table 3 in the text.
The variables that reduce the probability of a crisis and are significant
at the 0.10 level are similar lo those found by Frankel and Rose. In
particular, greater foreign direct investment, multilateral debt, reserve-
to-import ratio, or per capitai income growth reduce the probability of
a crisis, while an overvalued exchange rate increases the probability.
The one anomaly is that higher foreign interest rates seem to increase
the probability of a crisis.
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998)
We define the indicators as in the original paper, with the exception
of real appreciation, which is defined as the real exchange rate (mea-
sured using multilateral trade-weighted real exchange rates from un-
published estimates by World Bank staff, based on IMF data) relative
to its average value in 1989-91. We assume that there is no trend in
the real exchange rate; the results for the East Asian countries are
insensitive to this assumption,
In our updating ofthe Kaminsky, Lizondo. and Reinhart framework
a crisis in 1997 is defined according to the following criteria. A monthly
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Al. Probit Regression Estimates Predicting a Currency Crisis in 1997 Using
the Model of FVankel and Rose'
Variable
Commercial bank debl/tolal debl
Concessional debftotal debt
Variable rate debt/total debt
Short-term debt/total debt
Foreign direct investment/total debt







Domestic credit growth rate
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c. Percent of GDP
f. Pcrceni.
crisis index is computed as the weighted sum of the change in reserves
and the change in the nominal exchange rate (vis-^-vis the U.S. dollar),
where the weights are the inverse of the ariance of these variables
between January 1975 and June 1998. A crisis occurs in any given
month if this index rises more than 3 standard deviations above its mean
for that country. If there is a crisis in any month in 1997, we say a
crisis occurred in 1997.
The percentile rankings of the East Asian countries in December
1996 relative to their own history (1976-96) and to other developing
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T^ble A2. Vulnerability to Crisis for East Asian Countries in December 1996 Relative
to 1976-96, Using tbe Kamiasky, Lizondo, and Keinhart Model
Percenlile'
Indicator*'
Real exchange rate'' ( + )
Banking crisis in previous year^
Export growlh ( - )
Stock price growth ( - )
M2/reserves growth ( + )
Output growth ( - )
"Excess" Ml balances
Reserve growth ( —)
M2 multiplier growth ( + )
Domestic credit/GDP growlh ( + )
Real interest rate ( + )



























































Siiuicu. Author." calculamms using model of Kaminsky. l.i;tnrKli). and Reinhnrt II99S). baud on Imtrnauanai Financial
Siaiisiifi. and ihe real cxchiinge rate series described in inbk 2,
a. A higher pvrcentile jndicaict greater vulncrabiliiy. For bome indicutois {marked -t ) this a ihc perccnuge of munths
with values below ihat fiic December IW6. fur Ihe ethers (markcj - 1 ii ii ihe opposite Numbers thul esiced Kaminiiky,
Li/.ondo. and Rcinhan's warning thresholds aie m hnldface
b. Variables arc lisiedaccurdingio their adjusted signal-io-nmscmtiiis, as eslinulcd by Kuninsky. Lizundu, andReitihart.
c. Our definilion differs frotn thai of Kaminsky, Li-tunda, and Reinhtn.
d. W il there WHS a banking crisis in 1946: 0 uihcrwise.
countries in December 1996 are shown in tables A2 and A3, respec-
tively. Our sample of developing countries includes the low- and
middle-income countries in the IFC's emerging markets index (Argen-
tina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia,
Cote d'lvoire, Czech Republic, Ecuador. Egypt, Ghana, India, Indo-
nesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia,
Mauritius. Mexico, Morocco. Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Po-
land, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. South Africa. Sri
Lanka, Taiwan. Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Turkey. Ven-
ezuela, and Zimbabwe) plus Korea and Singapore. For most of the
variables, even the December 1996 data would not have been available
by the time the crisis struck in July 1997. In this sense, choosing such
a late date allows us to assess the causal impact of these variables, but
gives an unrealistic picture of how well the model would have predicted
the crisis. But anyone who estimated warning signals based on this
framework could have formed a reasonable expectation of the Decem-
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TMt A3. Vulnerability to Crisis for East Asian Countries in December 1996,























































Real exchange rate' (+ I
Banking crisis in previous
Export growth ( - )
SUJck price growth ( - )
M2/refierves growlh ( + )
Output growth ( - )
"Excess"' Ml balances
Reserve growth ( - )
M2 multiplier growth ( + )
Domestic credit/GDP growth ( + )
Real interest rate ( + )
Terms of trade growth {— )
i, ha>.eiiot\ Inirrnaiumal FinnncialSnurtc Aulhcjfi' caltulalii>ns usin|i model of Kamimky. Li«indo. iiml Reinhan (
5$aiiuitx, nnd Ihc real exchange rate Mrie^deiicribed in table 2.
a. Sve lablc A2. nole j .
b Sceinbic A2. ni>ic b.
c. Sec table A2. nntc c
(I See table A2. niHc d.
ber 1996 values of many of these variables by the early spring of 1997.
at the latest. Thus this reflects something like a three-month-ahead
prediction probability.
The higher the percentile. the greater the potential of a crisis. When
the vulnerability is indicated by a high indicator (as with the ratio of
M2 to reserve growth), the value is positive; when it is indicated by a
low indicator (as with export growth), it is negative. Numbers that
exceed the optimal thresholds derived by Kaminsky, Lizondo. and
Reinhart are indicated in boldface.
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996)
For the Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco regression, we extend the coun-
try sample and update the timing of the variables. We draw our country
sample from the IFC's emerging markets index, which represents a
reasonable selection of countries that are relatively open to international
capital movements. Excluding the European Union countries, Greece
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and Portugal, the transition economies, and the countries for which
there are insufficient data, we are left with thirty-four countries (four-
teen more than in Sachs. Tornell, and Velasco's sample): Argentina,
Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, China. Colombia, Cote d'lvoire,
Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Ko-
rea, Malaysia. Mauritius, Mexico. Morocco. Pakistan, Peru, Philip-
pines, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan. Thailand, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
With the exception of the real exchange rate, the data sources and
calculation methods are the same as in the original paper, but the timing







Growth in credit to the private sector,
1992-96.
Measured using a multilateral trade-
weighted real exchange rate index com-
puted by World Bank staff using IMF
data. The base period is 1988-92, and
the current period is set as the average of
January 1996 to June 1997, to avoid the
after-effects of the Tequila crisis.
Ratio of M2 to reserves, June 1997.
Weighted average of the percentage
change in the exchange rate and reserves
between June 1997 and December 1997.
Weights are country-specific and equalize
the contribution of each component to the
variance of the index over the previous
decade.
We use the same numerical cutoffs as the
original paper: dummy is 1 if a country
has a real depreciation greater than 16
percent or domestic credit growth in ex-
cess of 7 percent; otherwise, it is 0.
Countries with sound fundamentals in-
clude Cote d'lvoire, India, and Trinidad
and Tobago
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Inadequate reserves Dummy is 1 if a country's ratio of M2 to
dummy (D^") reserves is greater than 2.1; otherwise, it
is 0. Countries with adequate reserves in-
clude Botswana. Chile. Colombia,
Ghana, Peru, Singapore, and Vene-
zuela."'"
Sachs. Tornell. and Velasco estimate the following regression:
IND = b, + b,{RER) + b,{LB) + b.iD'-" x RER) + b,(O" x LB)
+ b^iiy-^ X D""' X RER) + b^{D'-^ x D"'^  X LB) + e.
They hypothesize that the effect of a real depreciation on the severity
of a crisis in a country with inadequate reserves and bad fundamentals
(b; + bj + b(,) will be significant and negative, and that the effect of
a lending boom on a country with inadequate reserves and bad funda-
mentals (b, + b, + bf) will be significant and positive. They find these
results in most of their specifications. They also hypothesize that these
variables will have no predictive power for the severity of a crisis in
countries with either adequate reserves or good fundamentals (b.. b,,
b, + b^, and b, + b^). They find this to be the case in most specifica-
tions of their model.
Table A4 shows the results from running the Sachs, Tornell, and
Velasco regression with our updated variables for 1997. both for our
expanded country sample and for the original country sample. In the
larger sample, the only meaningful combination of coefficients that is
significant and of the correct sign says that a lending boom in a country
with weak fundamentals and inadequate reserves increases the proba-
bility of a crisis. The degree of real appreciation in countries with weak
fundamentals and inadequate reserves is marginally significant but of
the wrong sign; greater real appreciation reduces the severity of a crisis.
Our second exercise with these data is to use the coefficients from
the 1996 paper to form a predicted index of the severity of the crisis in
140. Note that the top quartiles of the new sample are very close to the old ones for
real appreciation, dotnestic credit growth, and the ratio ot" M2 to reserves. Defining the
thresholds a.s the tup quartile ot" the new sample would thus have resulted in the same
dummy variahles lor almosl all ol" the countries. The results ure robusl to the alternative
definition.
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Table A4. Regression Results Explaining the Severity of the Crisis in 1997 Using the
Model or Sachs, Tornell. and Velasco"




Real appreciation x low reserves dummy (bj)
Lending boom x low reserves dummy (bj)
Real appreciation x low reserves
dummy x weak fundamentals dummy (bj
Lending boom x low reserves dummy x





Ho: bj -t- b, = 0
H,,: b, + b, -I- bft = 0
H,,: b, + bj = 0
H,.: bj + b, -f b, = 0
Source: Author!.' taltuialions using model of Sachs, Tomell. and Velosco (HW6). bused on Inlernalional Finamiol
Slallsliii. vnd Ihe real exchange rute series described in labtc 2.
a Variables and spccificaiiiin arc described inlhi-tcxl and by Sach:^, Tomell. and Vflaicn./) values are in parentheses.
Note ftiat results reported by Sachs. Tomell. and Vcla.sco include a numerical error: all re|>onecl cocrficienis must be divided
by 10 to be consilient with dctinidnns or vartubles.
b. A negative value indicjiies a teal appreciutiim.
c. This row IS impossible in estimate for Ihe original sample, iint-e il incluileh only one country v i^th sound fundamentals.
But Ihi!^  dae\ nol affect the hypothesis tests on Ihe combined values.
1997. We then compare these values with the actual crisis values.'""
The results are shown in table A5, where countries are listed in order
of the severity of the predicted crisis. The correlation between predicted
and actual values is 0.10 and is tiot significantly different from 0 at any
reasonable significance level.
141. Note that the results reported in Sachs. Tornell. and Velasco (1996) include a
numerical error: all of the reported coefficients should be divided by 10 to be consistent
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South Africa - 2 8
China - 5 - 7
Tunisia - 7 3
Pakistan - 7 9
Botswana —8 . 2
Chile - 1 1 8
Singapore — 11 - 18
Colombia - 1 4 18
Venezuela — 22 — 6
Mexico - 2 2 2
Source: Authors' calculations lti\ng tniidcl of Sachs. Tornell. and Velascu {19%). based on Inlernalitmal f'inamial
SlaiiyiUt mil tbe real exchange rale series descriticd in table 2
a Filled value bused on rcgra-ision tocfficienls reported by SBi:h\. Tornell. and Velasco, using dila prior lo Ihc oulbrcak
or Ihc EaM Asian crisis. Enact delinitians and timings of the varmblcit ace given in lext.
b Weighted uvciage ol (he pcicenlatie change in the nominul cxcbungc rate (againxi ihe U.S. dollar) between June utd
December i'i'i7 and the (negative) percent change in reserves Weighls ari: propottiunul lo the inverse of Ihe varinncei of
ihe monihlv values of these t*ii series between IISI and ]^'}b.
Jason Furman and Joseph E. Stiglitz 111
APPENDIX B
The Adverse Effects of an Interest Rate Increase
THE EXPECTED RETURN to a bond depends on the probability of bank-
ruptcy; as that increases, the expected return falls. In this appendix we
show that if there is initially credit rationing, an increase in the interest
rate will lead to more extensive credit rationing, that is, some existing
loans will not be roiled over. More generally, we show that there may
be adverse effects on the overall expected rate of return. If investors
are not risk neutral, the adverse effects on the desirability of investing
funds in the country are even greater, especially if there are adverse
effects on assets that are highly correlated, such as human capital.
Standard partial equilibrium models analyze the effect of an increase
in the interest rate on the probability of default. Assume the firm's
return is a random variable 6. Furthermore, the firm has outstanding
debt B, on which it pays a variable interest rate r. Its cash flow will be
sufficient to meet its debt obligations if
e > rB.
If e is distributed with distribution function f (8), then the probability
of default is
F{rB)
and the increase in the probability of default as a result of an increase
in /• is simply
dF/dr = BfirB),
where/is the density function.'"^
142. This simple model both under- and overstates bankruptcy: even if its current
casb flows are insufficient to meet current obiigations. a firm might be willing to make
loans to finance the deficit if future expectations are sufficiently positive. Yet its obli-
gations also include loans coming due; if lenders are pessimistic, they will refuse to roll
over those loans at any interest rate. That is whal happened in the East Asian countries.
Note that a refusal to roll over is inconsistent with standard models, in which there is
always an interest rate which would induce a lender to roll over. But with the standard
models of imperfect information in capital markets there can be credit rationing, so that
there is no interest rate at which lenders are willing to roll over. The fact that there is a
rollover crisis is thus fully consistent with the models on which we focus and totally
inconsistent with the standard model.
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Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss (1981) show that in response to the in-
crease in r. firms will in fact change their behavior in such a way as to
increase the probability of bankruptcy: that is, F is a function of r. But
beyond that, in any "tirm-specific" contingency, the return itself de-
pends on macroeconomic conditions. In this framework, we represent
macroeconomic conditions by the interest rate on safe government se-
curities, r,,,. In general terms, these considerations can be modeled by
extending the distribution function of 0 to f (8, r, r^) and assuming
that F, > 0, F3 > 0, and F, > 0.
In this more general specification, the increase in the probability of
default as a result of an increase in r,,,, which in turn induces an increase
in r, is
^ = {fi F, + FJ ^ + F, > 0.
An increase in r leads to an increase in bankruptcy on three accounts:
the direct effect from the increased obiigations (the first term in the
equation above), the increased risk-taking that this induces (second
term), and the adverse macroeconomic effects that result (third term).
One can now ask whether an increase in interest rates makes it more
or less desirable to roll over a loan, or to make a new loan. Consider
the expected return to a loan p, and assume that if the ftrtn goes bank-
rupt, it incurs costs of C. To simplify the notation, assume that all
possible realizations of 6 are larger than C. The expected return to the
loan is
£
The change in this return with respect to a change in r,,,, which in turn
induces an increase in r, is
B
' rB - (e-C)
•'''in
This expression can be interpreted as follows. In a world without
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bankruptcy, the expected return would increase one to one with the
lending interest rate. But in this more general framework, four different
terms (all of which are positive) guarantee that the rate of return will
increase by far less than the interest rate. The first term represents the
fact that there is a probability of bankruptcy F. The second term is the
dissipative cost of bankruptcy (C) multiplied by the additional firms
that go bankrupt as a result of the higher lending interest rate (the
density function evaluated at 6 = rB). The third term represents the
moral hazard effect that increases the probability of a lower return. And
the fourth term represents the externality from the overall macroeco-
nomic weakening due to the higher tiiarket interest rate, which increases
the probability of bankruptcy. In general, however, the sign of the
derivative as a whole will be ambiguous.
But when firms are credit rationed, an increase in the policy interest
rate, r,^, always leads to a lowering of the expected return to private
loans if there are adverse macroeconomic effects. This is a simple
application of the envelope theorem. To see this, define the maximum
return as the highest expected return maximized over the choice of
interest rate, p* = max, [p]. Note that the change in the maximum
return can be written as
dp* _ dp* dr dp*
dr„, dr dr„, dr
Recall from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that when there is credit ration-
ing, interest rates are set so as to maximize the expected return, where
each firm ignores the effect of its actions on the macroeconomy. In this
case.
B
so that the total effect is just
dp* r rB - (e-C)
B dF, < 0.
Thus whenever there is credit rationing, raising the interest rate will
lower the expected return, and thus drive capital out of the country.
It is important to emphasize that this result is not general; it requires
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that there initially be credit rationing. Therefore it is perfectly consistent
with the observation that there have been numerous instances in which
raising the interest rate has had the desired effect. In Latin America,
for example, firms typically have low debt-to-equity ratios, so that their
probability of default is low; and capital markets are highly segmented,
so that many borrowers are insulated from the effects of an increase in
the interest rate, at least in the short run. Moreover, an increase in the
deposit rate in government-insured deposits (where a government pro-
vides such insurance or is believed to be providing such a guarantee)
may attract capital, even as lenders are pulling out funds from firms
that are at risk of default. In that ca.se, the net effect is ambiguous. At
the very least, this analysis should warn against the blanket use of the
policy of raising interest rales in response to a devaluation, or the threat
of one. Finally, to the extent that the debt held outside Ihe country is
sovereign debt, the factors influencing default are markedly different
from those that have been analyzed in this section.
in response to the above arguments, one might object that if lenders
set interest rates to maximize expected returns, an increase in the bank
discount rate may have no effect on lending rates. While that is true,
the concerns we raise are more serious. There are then two categories
of borrower: marginal and inframarginal. For the marginal borrowers,
if p^^ ^ represents the maximutn rate of expected return that can be
extracted from them, regardless of the rate of interest charged, and if
p* is the market rate of return, then p^ .^ ^ = p*. But it is clear that if
macroeconomic conditions deteriorate p^ .^ ,. will fall, and marginal
groups will accordingly be cut out of the market: the extent of the roll-
over problem will increase. Indeed, if the macroeconomic effects are
large enough, even inframarginal borrowers will be excluded from the
market.

